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Flood literature presents an inconsistent account of post-disaster distress; debating whether distress is 
pathological or normal and attempting to understand distress in terms of disaster variables.   The 
literature therefore provides little guidance as to how to formulate difficulties in a clinically 
meaningful way reflective of individual’s experiences.  The SPAARS model is presented as a model 
by which to reconcile these differences and quantitative support for its concepts were studied within 
two flooded samples. 
 
Participants who were flooded in Carlisle in 2005 (n=32) and participants flooded in Morpeth in 2008 
(n=29) provided two samples at different stages in flood recovery and facilitated a quasi-longitudinal 
sample for comparison of flood-related distress over time.  Participants were asked to complete a 
survey pertaining to: basic emotions experienced during the flood event, basic emotions experienced 
after the flood, Impact of Events Scale-Revised (IES-R), Regulation of Emotions Questionnaire (REQ) 
and the Trauma Symptom Inventory (TSI).   
 
Findings suggest that a third of participants who were flooded experienced clinically significant 
levels of distress, even after four years.  Both samples showed higher levels of impact symptoms on 
the IES compared to symptoms on the TSI.  Anxiety and anger were significant in reported flood 
experiences both during and after the flooding.  Flood-related variables and previous experiences had 
no effect on increased distress but greater use of internal-dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies 
was related to increased impact and distress symptoms.   Study findings and the SPAARS model are 
discussed in relation to previous flooding and PTSD literature, as well as clinical implications for the 






1.0   Disasters and Definitions 
 
Exposure to traumatic events is statistically more common than most people realise and a substantial 
body of literature into their effects has been amassed over the past 25 years (Neria et al., 2008).  More 
than two-thirds of the general population will be exposed to traumatic events within their lifetime 
(Breslau et al., 1998) and studies suggest that up to one-fifth of Americans may experience traumatic 
events in the USA in any given year (Kessler et al., 1995; Norris, 1992; Resnick et al., 1993).  Of 
particular interest are the effects of disaster events on those exposed to them (Norris et al., 2004).   
 
Traumatic events constitute a variety of experiences and the trauma literature unfortunately does not 
provide a consistent distinction between individual traumatic events and disasters (Quarantelli, 
1995).  Neria et al. (2008) suggest that disasters ‚are best considered as being collectively experienced 
or mass traumas‛ (p.474) and Tierney et al. (2001) suggests that they are events that are, by definition, 
extremely harmful and disruptive.  More specifically, Neria et al. (2008) outline that ‚definitions 
should account for at least two dimensions: scale and outcome.  If an incident is large in scale 
(affecting a considerable number of people) regardless of loss of life, and its consequences are 
‘significant’ (i.e. resulted in quantifiable mental and/or physical health outcomes)‛ (p.474) then it can 
be considered as a ‘disaster’.   
 
1.1  Natural Disasters 
 
Although the majority of disaster research has focussed upon studying intentional human-caused 
events, such as mass-violence or terrorism, literature on the effects of natural disasters specifically has 
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increased dramatically over the past 25 years (Norris et al., 2004).  Natural disasters understandably 
share many features of disasters caused by human action or technological failures (Neria et al., 2008). 
However, disasters caused by environmental events can be seen as being distinctly different in a 
number of ways.   
 
Firstly, natural disasters are by far the most commonly occurring of all disaster events (Neria et al., 
2008).  They massively outnumber both human and technological disasters in their frequency and 
geographic distribution across the world (Brunello et al., 2001) and they tend to affect wider 
geographic areas at their time of occurrence (e.g. over an entire region of a country, compared with 
smaller and more specific affected groups of human and technological disasters).  Consequently, 
natural disasters affect more heterogeneous populations, involving victims both directly and 
indirectly (Carr et al., 1995; Shannon et al., 1994; Thompson et al., 1993).  Nevertheless, the distribution 
of disasters occurring worldwide varies considerably with certain geographical areas being exposed 
to more frequently occurring large-scale traumatic events than others (Brunello et al., 2001; Kessler, 
2000).    
 
2.0   Post-disaster impact in detail 
The impact and consequences of disaster experiences include a wide range of psychopathology (Neria 
et al., 2006; Norris et al., 2002).  Within the literature, posttraumatic stress disorder is the most 
commonly studied post-disaster psychopathology (Galea et al., 2005; Norris et al., 2002), generally 
because it is considered to be ‚among the most common adverse consequences for which disaster 
victims are at risk‛ (Norris et al., 2004, p.283) and likely to be the ‚central pathology after such events‛ 






2.1  Posttraumatic Reactions 
 
Reviews of the literature report evidence of PTSD in 68 per cent of all natural disaster samples (Norris 
et al., 2002) although the prevalence of PTSD documented after natural disasters is often lower than 
for other disaster events (Galea et al., 2005; Norris et al., 2002).  Literature varies regarding the degree 
of reported prevalence, ranging from 3.7 per cent (Canino et al., 1990) to 60 per cent (Madakasira & 
O’Brien, 1987) within the first two years after natural disasters.  The bulk of the literature report 
estimates within the lower half of this range (Liu et al., 2006; Norris et al., 2004; Parslow et al., 2006), 
which is reflected in PTSD prevalence of 32 per cent reported following Mexico City earthquake (de la 
Fuente, 1990) and 29 per cent following Hurricane Paulina and Hurricane Katrina (Manuel, 2006; 
Norris et al., 2001).  However despite reduced prevalence compared to other types of events, the 
literature suggests that six months post-event, the prevalence of ‚disaster-specific PTSD‛ in fact 
remains strikingly high (Norris et al., 2004, p.289).   
 
2.2  Additional post-event difficulties 
 
Although PTSD has been the general focus within the literature, natural disasters are also associated 
with increased prevalence of ‚severe psychiatric symptoms, including depression, somatic 
complaints and nightmares‛ (Bland et al., 1996, p.18).  Following floods in California in 1997, Waelde, 
et al. (1998) also noted symptoms of acute stress within the affected population as well as PTSD.  In 
fact, 38 per cent of those affected by a flood in the Midwest of the United States in 1993 were reported 
to meet criteria for other psychiatric disorders (McMillen et al., 2002) with studies suggesting that 
depression in particular is common after such events (Bolton et al., 2000; de la Fuente, 1990, Fullerton 
et al., 1999; Lima et al., 1991; McFarlane & Papay, 1992; Norris et al., 1999) ‚often occurring in 
combination with PTSD‛ (Norris et al., 2004, p.283).  Indeed one in four of those with diagnosable 
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PTSD following hurricane experience also met criteria for major depressive disorder (Norris et al., 
2004).    
 
 
2.3  Focus on Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms 
 
When focussing on posttraumatic stress symptoms experienced, studies describe that symptoms of 
PTSD begin soon after the event (North et al., 1997; Waelde et al., 2001).  Disaster victims may 
continue to experience these impacts long after the event (Steinglass & Gerrity, 1990; Bland et al., 1996; 
Tunstall et al., 2006), which may persist for years after a disaster which is particularly severe (Green et 
al., 1990; Yule et al., 2000).  Other literature suggests there may also be delayed onset of symptoms 
(Green et al., 1990).  A year after disaster events, the degree of recovery still occurring was considered 
so substantial that Norris et al. (2004) suggested distress may be particularly prolonged in the 
aftermath of major disasters.   
 
In all disaster samples, symptoms are reported to improve over time (Bland et al., 1996) but it is 
suggested that such improvements differ depending upon the time points at which symptoms are 
followed-up.  For example, some findings suggest that symptoms follow a linear decline (Carr et al., 
1997a; 1997b; van Griensven et al., 2006); whereas other findings suggest that initial declines later 
stabilise (Bromet et al., 1990; Carr et al., 1997a; McFarlane, 1989).  For example, a significant number of 
survivors of a dam-burst continued to show ‚clinically noteworthy psychopathology after 14 years‛ 
(Bland et al., 1996, p.22) which could not be explained in terms of issues prolonging the event such as 
ongoing litigation.     Furthermore, other evidence suggests symptoms fluctuate (Phifer et al., 1988) 
and can also be found to increase at times after disasters (Neria et al., 2008; Norris et al., 2004; Wang et 
al., 2000).  However, discrimination of specific symptoms experienced might explain inconsistent 
findings.  For example, following Hurricane Andrew in 1999, the prevalence of PTSD symptoms was 
reported to increase in those affected from 26 per cent to 29 per cent between 6 months and 30 months 
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after the event.  But, when symptoms are specified more clearly, intrusion and arousal symptoms 
declined over this time, whereas avoidance symptoms increased in prevalence (Norris et al., 1999).  
Importantly, increased avoidance yet reduced intrusions and hyperarousal might reflect a more 
normative or understandable response post-disaster than much of the PTSD literature allows for.   
 
Despite reductions in symptom prevalence, studies show that even two years after an event, the 
prevalence of PTSD was much higher than the baseline for PTSD within the country and could 
remain significant enough to pose a public health concern (Brom et al., 1990; Carr et al., 1997; 
McFarlane et al., 1989; Norris et al., 2004).  Indeed there was evidence in some samples that ‚if 
recovery had not occurred within 18 months or so, it was unlikely to happen at all‚(Norris et al., 2004, 
p.290) drawing a conclusion that following disasters ‚PTSD takes a chronic course in approximately 
one third of those who develop the condition‛ (Norris et al., 2004, p.290). 
 
2.4 Focus on disaster predictors 
 
Although all disasters have the potential to generate significant distress in those affected, disasters 
within the developing world are considered to be ‚particularly problematic‛ (Norris et al., 2004, 
p.283).  Literature suggests that the location of disasters is a greater predictor of impact than disaster 
type (for example, flooding, or earthquakes) (Norris et al., 2002).  Comparable disasters in the United 
States compared with Latin America showed more severe effects in Latin America (Norris et al., 2004) 
and studies have suggested that Latin American populations are at higher risk of developing PTSD 
than other survivor populations (Galea et al., 2002; Perilla et al., 2002).  However it is suggested that 
‚psychological health impacts are often more severe and longer lasting than physical health impacts, 
particularly within the Northern hemisphere‛ (Carroll et al., 2009) although reviews suggest that 
‚more research is required before such conclusions are reached with certainty‛ (Norris et al., 2004 
p.24) and it is recognised that disasters within different parts of the world are not readily comparable. 
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Much of the literature pertains to investigating specific aspects of disasters that might make one 
disaster more stressful than another, or more distressing to different sample groups.  For example, 
evacuation or experience of financial loss due to an earthquake was related to greater distress than is 
found in the absence of these experiences (Bland et al., 1996).  In addition, women are suggested to be 
more affected by disasters than men (Shore, Tatum & Vollmer, 1986) and studies show that 
prevalence of PTSD is higher among people who are closer to the event than those in more distantly 
affected areas (Jordan et al., 2004; Neria et al., 2006; Schlenger et al., 2002).  However, disasters have 
also been reported to frequently affect populations that are not directly exposed to the event (for 
example, those who experience loss of family members or properties while they are absent) (Neria et 
al., 2008).  Evidence also suggests that mental health consequences within people indirectly-exposed 
to disasters may in fact be comparable or sometimes exceed that of those exposed directly (Galea et 
al., 2005; Pfefferbaum et al., 1999; Schlenger et al., 2002; Silver et al., 2002).  In terms of the 
psychological impact of exposure, one review of post-disaster literature suggests fairly consistent 
estimates of PTSD among specific exposed groups within the first year, with prevalence in direct 
victims ranging between 30 per cent and 40 per cent; prevalence in rescue workers being lower, 
between 10 per cent and 20 per cent and prevalence in the general population being between 5 per 
cent and 10 per cent (Neria et al., 2008).   
 
However in terms of the effects of disaster-variables, Norris et al. (2004) suggested that few definitive 
conclusions could be reached.  In attempting to predict the severity of traumas, much of the literature 
is directed at human-caused disasters, such as incidents of mass violence in which those affected are 
considered to be at greater risk of distress, than those affected by other types of disaster (natural or 
technological) (Norris et al., 2004).  In addition, the lower prevalence of PTSD noted in the aftermath 
of natural disasters (Norris et al., 2002; Galea et al., 2005), is considered to relate to ‚lower average 
dosage of exposure among people exposed to natural disasters‛ (Neria et al., 2008, p.473) which is 
supported by findings of higher PTSD prevalence in those closer to the epicentre of disasters 
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compared to those further away (Basoglu et al., 2004).  However Norris et al. (2004) is quick to warn 
that the lower prevalence of PTSD is ‚often wrongly over-generalised to imply that natural disasters 
have minimal trauma potential‛ (p.284).  Indeed higher prevalence estimates of PTSD are found in 
specific affected groups, such as clinical samples (Livanou et al., 2002; Soldatos et al., 2006) and 
populations in areas exposed to multiple disasters (Finnsdottir & Elklit, 2002; Najarian et al., 2001).  In 
addition, such prevalence might be lower but can be longer term, as noted by an earthquake-affected 
sample in Turkey where estimated PTSD prevalence was reported as 11.7 per cent even three years 
after the disaster (Onder et al., 2006). 
 
2.5 Limitation of focus on disaster variables  
 
Many reviews maintain that there are ‚consistently documented determinants of the risk of PTSD, 
with measures of the magnitude of the exposure to the event, particularly the degree of physical 
injury, immediate risk to life, severity of property destruction and frequency of fatalities being 
especially predictive of high rates of PTSD‛ (Neria et al., 2008, p.475).  Studies consequently focus 
upon distinguishing distress based on predictors within the events, such as severity of losses (Bolin, 
1985; Green, 1982) evacuation or damage (Norris et al., 2004) 
 
Norris et al. (2004) suggested that it is ‚reasonable to anticipate that natural disasters involving 
sudden onset, mass casualties and high trauma exposure are likely to be more pathogenic than 
natural disasters characterised by property damage and loss‛ (p.284).  However, they also note that 
findings into the comparative impact of specific stressors within natural disasters (such as injury, 
threat to life, bereavement, loss or relocation) have been inconsistent and inconclusive in predicting 
distress (Norris et al., 2004).  Furthermore, other studies corroborate that making distinctions between 
disaster variables in predicting psychological impacts is not particularly informative (Bolin, 1985; 
Green, 1982).  For example, Bland et al. (1996) report that distress is ‚not just a function of exposure to 
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tremors (in the case of earthquakes) but is dependent on the consequences of the disaster‛ (p.23).   
This broadening of focus may be more useful in providing explanations for the differences in sample 
responses; for example, why post-event prevalence of PTSD six months after an event was three times 
higher in one community than the prevalence in a nearby community that experienced the same 
disaster (Norris et al., 2004).   
 
2.6  Variations / Inconsistencies  
 
Although a broader disaster focus might seem like a sensible suggestion, Norris et al. (2004) highlights 
that disasters come in a ‚myriad of forms and severities‛ (p.284).  Disasters are therefore vastly 
heterogeneous experiences for those affected, making it difficult to draw parallels between events 
which are often as different as they are similar in nature.  In addition, the literature is complicated by 
the fact that some populations have repeated experiences of the same type of disaster (Bland et al., 
1996).   
 
There is some evidence that experience of previous trauma increases the risk of developing 
posttraumatic stress symptoms following subsequent exposure to traumatic events.  For example, 
greater distress after an earthquake was noted in those who experienced damage and distress in an 
earlier earthquake compared with those with no previous earthquake-related damage or distress 
(Bland et al., 1996).  In this study, prior disaster experience was considered to ‚arouse a level of 
distress significant enough to preclude additional arousal with the second experience‛ (Bland et al., 
1996, p.22).  Conversely however, Norris & Murrell (1988) noted an ‘inoculation effect’, in that anxiety 
in a sample affected by flooding in Kentucky in 1984 was reduced if they had experience of a prior 
flood in 1981 compared to those flooded for the first time in 1984.   Consequently, previous flood 
experience appeared to protect individuals from distress in subsequent flood experiences but findings 




Both of these arguments unfortunately rely too much on perceiving disasters as predictable events 
with predictable effects.  Furthermore they focus exclusively upon objective variables without 
considering that both effects could be entirely valid but under different circumstances.  For example, 
how valid is it to directly compare responses to flooding with those experienced during earthquakes?  
Although both are potentially life-threatening, flooding may be marginally more predictable in 
nature.  Within flood events, the greatest danger presents itself by flood waters underfoot and routes 
to higher areas would be the most obvious method of reaching safety.  It is therefore plausible that 
each exposure would lead to more effective coping though experience of escape methods.  By 
comparison, however, the potential for escape during earthquakes is more dangerous as both open 
ground and built up areas present equivalent threats to physical integrity; for example, by falling into 
moving crevices or from buildings collapsing.  Consequently, earthquakes are potentially as 
dangerous and novel with each recurrent event, reducing the opportunity for individuals to learn 
better ways of escaping.  Individuals may therefore experience as much fear (if not more) in a 
subsequent earthquake as in their first experience of this event.  Unfortunately this demonstrates the 
weakness of the literature’s focus upon objective predictors of distress.  By instead considering the 
meaning of the particular circumstances for those affected, or the consequences of particular types of 
events it is possible that contradictory findings may all be valid but under different circumstances. 
 
 
2.7  Specific disaster focus  
 
As discussed, natural disasters include a variety of events such as earthquakes, floods, bush fires, 
tsunamis and volcanic eruptions.  They vary significantly from one type to another and occur with 
greater frequency within particular parts of the world, making it difficult to draw parallels between 
events in trying to predict impact and distress.  Countries most affected by natural disasters tend to 
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be within the developing world, with poorer prognosis for those affected related to the lack of 
infrastructure surrounding them (Neria et al., 2008).  However, this increased frequency in some areas 
also lends itself to differences in the expectations of natural disasters within affected populations and 
their greater acceptance of disaster occurrence.  Consequently, different types of disaster pose 
different challenges depending upon the population as well as the event.  As such, focussing upon 
one specific type and location of disaster can be valuable to maintain clarity in the face of these 
differences within the literature.  As such, this study aims to focus specifically on the occurrence of 
flood disasters occurring exclusively within the United Kingdom.   
 
3.0   Flooding 
Flooding is the most frequently reported and costly of all natural disasters that occur worldwide 
(Hewitt, 1997).  Importantly, the extent of flooding and its impacts are expected to increase over the 
next century due to global warming (IPCC, 2007; Stern & HM Treasury, 2007).  In addition, regional 
changes in flood distribution may result in areas which have not been previously affected becoming 
affected for the first time (Few, 2006).  Unfortunately, communities have come to expect to be 
protected from flooding, believing it will not happen to them, making them less aware of the 
potential risks and the likely health impacts of living within floodplains (Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008).   
 
Previously in the United Kingdom, river floods have typically been small in scale and short-lived. 
However, since 1998 there have been more frequent incidents of extreme events and severe flooding 
year on year (Tapsell & Tunstall 2008).  The most notable of these incidents in recent years pertain to 
flooding in Boscastle (2004), Carlisle (2005), Hull and Tewkesbury (2007) and Morpeth (2008) 
(Environment Agency, 2005a; 2005b).  Nevertheless it is estimated that two million properties and 
four million people within the UK are considered to be at risk from river, estuary or coastal flooding 
(Evans et al., 2004).  Unfortunately, increased vulnerability to pluvial, groundwater and sewer 
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flooding within urban areas may significantly increase this risk (Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008) making 
potential flooding a serious public health consideration.   
 
Despite their increasing frequency, the systematic research on the health outcomes related to flooding 
is limited (Few et al., 2004; Hajat et al., 2003), however clinical interest in natural disasters is increasing 
(Fewtrell & Kay, 2008), mainly due to the perception that climate change leads to an increase in the 
occurrence and magnitude of extreme flood events (Evans et al., 2004). Fortunately, research into 
health effects associated with flooding has increased dramatically in recent years (Hajat et al., 2003; 
Ohl & Tapsell, 2000; Tapsell & Tunstall, 2003).  This is valuable in understanding the consequences of 
flooding as the devastation to properties is usually obvious but the ‚impacts where drowning and 
physical injury do not occur can be more subtle‛ (Fewtrell & Kay, 2008, p.446).   
 
3.1  Health effects of flooding  
 
The first investigation into flood impact in the UK followed the 1968 flooding in Bristol (Bennett, 
1970). The report documented the flood’s specific impact on health, highlighting that primary care 
attendance rose by 53 per cent and referrals and admissions to hospitals more than doubled after the 
flood.  However, despite increased research interest in these issues, a review on health consequences 
of flooding in Europe concluded that flood-associated health impacts were still poorly defined (Hajat 
et al., 2003).   
 
Literature suggests that flooding may potentially impact on health in a number of ways, with the 
most serious being the obvious risk of death from drowning or serious injury sustained as a result of 
the disaster (Tunstall et al., 2006).  More common health effects pertain to minor injuries (Manuel, 
2006; Schmidt et al., 1993), diarrhoeal episodes or gastrointestinal illness (Reacher et al., 2004; Wade et 
al., 2004), respiratory disease (Franklin et al., 2000) and a variety of psychological impacts (World 
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Health Organisation, 2003).    In terms of perceptions of health impacts, the majority of respondents in 
a flooded sample (59 per cent) attributed physical health effects as related directly to the flood, in 
particular reporting physiological shock reactions either during or immediately after the flood 
(Tunstall et al., 2006).  Physical health problems which develop later are generally attributed to the 
effects of being exposed to cold and contaminated water or to living in cold damp conditions, as well 
as the physical effort and stress associated with the clean-up of their homes (Tapsell et al., 1999; 
Tapsell & Tunstall, 2001; Tunstall et al., 2006).  Reporting of physical health effects within flooded 
populations typically reduces in the early weeks and months following floods and generally recedes 
over time (Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008), however there is a consensus that flooding is likely to contribute 
to both short and longer term physical and psychological health effects (Tunstall et al., 2006).  Indeed, 
it is the psychological impacts of flooding that are much more commonly reported once flooding has 
subsided (Tunstall et al., 2006).  In particular, it is the ‚so-called intangible impacts of flooding‛ 
(Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008, p.137) that can often be more significant to people than the event itself or its 
associated financial losses (Green et al., 1994; Parker et al., 1983).   
 
 
3.2  Psychological Health effects  
 
In common with other traumatic life events, flooding in the UK is associated with increased rates of 
mental health difficulties, particularly anxiety and depression (Bennet, 1970; Reacher et al., 2004; 
Tapsell & Tunstall, 2006).  Flooded households show a significantly increased risk of distress 
compared to non-flooded homes (Reacher et al., 2004) even when non-flooded households are at risk 
of flooding (Tunstall et al., 2006).   
 
34 per cent flood-affected individuals have been identified as displaying clinically significant 
impairment in psychological health on the GHQ-12, which is higher than would be expected for the 
general population (Department of Health, 1998).  Norris et al. (2001) also identified difficulties 
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associated with functioning and everyday life, including troubled family and social relationships, 
social disruption, occupational and financial stress, concerns about living conditions and about the 
condition of the wider community, as well as feeling an obligation to provide support to others.  
However, these stresses might be considered understandable and almost expected within a 
population enduring the circumstances associated with flooding.  In most cases, these difficulties 
would not be considered pathological in nature.  The literature also suggests that psychological 
consequences relating to personal loss of property after flooding are relatively short-lived (less than a 
year in duration) whereas exposure to more widespread community destruction is responsible for 
longer term impact (up to two years in duration) regardless of individual loss sustained (Phifer & 
Norris, 1989).   
 
Literature consistently documents that, in the aftermath of floods, those affected experience 
physiological changes at times of distress, such as episodes of increased rainfall (Tapsell & Tunstall, 
2008) and increased reactivity to stressors that are similar to the traumatic event (Beck & Franke, 
1996), for example, reporting ‚increased anxiety when it rains heavily and when storms are forecast‛ 
(Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008, p.147).  Associated behavioural changes are also widely reported by flood-
affected populations, who show tendencies towards regular monitoring of river levels as well as 
moving possessions to different parts of their properties (such as upper floors or higher shelves), 
choosing more flood-resilient home furnishings and staying at home when heavy rain is forecast 
(Carroll et al., 2009).   
 
Furthermore, increased levels of stress attributed to flood experience are reported to be evident 18 
months after the event, even following complete reinstatement of damaged property and removal of 
objective stressors (Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008).  There is also a strong indication from the literature that 
displacement as well as loss is an important factor in flood-related psychological distress (Tapsell & 
Tunstall, 2008).  In fact post-flood disruption in the UK has consistently been reported as the most 
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significant stressor from flooding (Green et al., 1985; Parker et al., 1983; Tapsell & Tunstall, 2001; 
Tunstall et al., 2006).  During the flood, perceived loss of control due to flooding is the most 
commonly reported reaction, with feelings of helplessness around the realisation that there is nothing 
that can be done to prevent the destruction (Horowitz, 1979).  However, such loss of control also 
extends to experiences of reinstatement and future flood management.  Experiencing difficulties in 
dealing with builders or insurance companies have been found to detrimentally affect the health 
outcomes of flooded individuals almost regardless of their initial flood experience (Tunstall et al., 
2006).  Furthermore the literature describes that disputes with industrial companies is as significant in 
generating severe psychological stress as the initial disaster event (Erikson, 1976; 1994; Tapsell & 
Tunstall, 2008).    
 
Importantly though, the literature cites that distress is not merely related to flood-specific variables, 
but is also influenced by individual factors such as gender and personal history of health or illness 
(Fordham, 1998; Galea et al., 2005); accumulation of stressors (Verger et al., 2003); lack of personal 
control (Massad & Hulsey, 2006; Reghr et al., 2000) perceived and received social support or ability to 
cope with the event (Declerq & Palmans, 2006; Ozer et al., 2003; Peres, Mercante & Nasello, 2005) and 
resilience (Bonanno, 2004).   
 
3.3  Importance of perception  
 
Studies suggest that the perception of natural disasters differs across the world and is an important 
consideration for understanding disaster-related distress.  For example, the risk of fire in regions of 
Australia that are frequently affected by bushfires appears to be perceived as inevitable, with 
populations recognising that nature is always changing (Cox & Holmes, 2000).  However, this 
perception is not shared in flooded populations in the UK where natural disasters objectively occur 
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less frequently and where the perception is that ‚nature, even if not standing still, could be managed‛ 
(Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008, p.149).   
 
In reference to flood perceptions, it is necessary to consider how perceptions of disaster events might 
be influenced by distress experienced by those affected.  Unfortunately, there is little consideration of 
this within the flood literature and it can be difficult to interpret the ‘reality’ of experiences, 
distressing though they are, in the absence of objective evidence about individual’s circumstances.  
For example, the literature reports considerable fear among flood-affected individuals that homes 
were contaminated from raw sewage in the flood waters and that ‚the smell lingering for months 
after homes were back in order‛ (Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008, p.150).   Despite being a legitimate and 
understandable concern, it is difficult to know whether this was an accurate reflection of reality or a 
perception related to flood distress.  In the aftermath of flooding, homes are often reinstated over a 
year after floods have subsided.  This often involves buildings being gutted to their foundations, 
washed and disinfected before all internal constructions are replaced and homes are decorated and 
furnished.  Although it is possible for contractors to cut corners, it is difficult to know whether 
sewage contamination could still linger over this length of time, or whether understandable concerns 
and increased anxiety in some individuals might make this ‘smell’ return as intrusive phenomena.  
When working clinically with distressed individuals, practitioners would typically consider the 
presence of corroborating evidence for the validity of perceptions, and therefore not questioning this 
within flooded samples starts to limit the generalisability of findings to clinical work within these 
populations. 
 
4.0   Specific Case Studies 
The literature presents a small number of qualitative studies into the effects of specific floods upon 
the local population, for example in Carlisle (Carroll et al., 2009) and Banbury and Kidlington (Tapsell 
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& Tunstall, 2008).  Their particular relevance pertains to the fact that previous literature ‚identified 
the events that triggered anxiety and stress but neglected the underlying psychological processes and 
deeper aspects of the impact upon mental health‛ (Carroll et al., 2009, p.540).  Consequently, 
reviewing these studies presents the personal impacts of flooding in illuminating detail, highlighting 
the most salient points reported by those affected.  
 
4.1  Specific features of flooding – personal accounts 
 
Initial flood impacts pertain to ‚surprise at the speed, power and depth of the flood waters and length 
of time it was in properties‛ (Carroll et al., 2009 p.542) with ‚the shock of seeing flood water enter 
homes and being helpless to prevent it, which had a significant impact on some participants 
especially if they were alone at the time of the flood‛ (Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008, p.142).  On this issue, 
participants provide vivid descriptions of their experiences:  
 
“I woke up, stepped out of bed into a foot of water... the windows were jammed [shut], I couldn’t 
open the door, it was terrifying” (Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008, p.142); 
 
“Water rushing down the road like Niagara Falls” (Carroll et al., 2009, p.542) 
 
“It was like the Titanic... listening to things falling over and falling out of cupboards” (Carroll et al., 
2009 p.542).   
 
Experiences are described in strong emotional terms, as people felt ‚horrified, terrified, never being 
so frightened in their lives; a genuine fear that lives were in danger‛ (Carroll et al., 2009, p.542) and 




By highlighting these descriptions, Carroll et al. (2009) makes a valuable contribution in focusing 
upon the importance of individual experiences rather than reliance upon discriminating distress 
based upon objective flood variables as found in other flood literature.  Furthermore, most 
retrospective studies forget that at the time of researching events, the outcome is already known (for 
example, that damage was limited to property and there was no loss of life) such that it can be easy to 
minimise the fear experienced at the time.  Consequently, Carroll et al. (2009) provide a valuable 
reminder that those affected by flooding experience greater fear, uncertainty about severity of the 
outcome and the feeling of danger during the first moments of the event than some studies allow for.  
In addition, vivid accounts by those affected highlight that much of the terror felt at the time does not 
merely pertain to the water entering properties as most researchers assume, but is also related to 
aspects of the experience which receive little discussion within the flood literature.  For example, 
within Carlisle, at the time of flood water entering properties, power was cut to the entire city, 
making communication with the outside world and with emergency services impossible.  Without 
radio contact, those affected did not know how to raise help, receive information about the severity of 
the event or get advice for what to do.  Families experienced difficult physical circumstances in the 
depth of winter, with homes rapidly losing heat, filled with freezing sewage-contaminated water and 
many people without food or clean water for over 24 hours.  Initially water receded but news spread 
that the flood would return at the next high tide but with greater force and height.  Consequently 
people abandoned their homes in a panic-stricken exodus leaving a very anxious few with nowhere 
else to go, who remained in their homes waiting for the event to worsen with nothing they could do 
and no means of raising help.  For these individuals, looting and burglaries became a problem.  
Criminal gangs (some travelling from other counties to prey on abandoned homes), entered 
properties by force regardless of whether they were inhabited or not.  Individuals watched as 
neighbours’ homes were entered by force, uncertain if theirs would be next, whether they should 
intervene, whether looters were armed and unable to contact the police for assistance: all while 
awaiting a second flood which might be more dangerous than the first.   Consequently, when detail of 
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events are considered in greater depth, it is clearer how much of the threat presented at the time was 
due to factors other than water in people’s homes.  Concerningly, little of this detail receives 
consideration within the literature and even less is considered when researchers and clinicians 
anecdotally describe what they think it might be like to be flooded. 
 
4.2  Stresses in the aftermath 
 
Flood literature tends to focus upon the extent of financial loss sustained as a predictor of distress 
after flooding.  However, Carroll et al. (2009) reminds us that the degree of damage to the structure of 
properties ‚often required larger restoration projects than first thought‛ (Carroll et al., 2009, p.542), 
with many respondents expressing that losing the fundamental fabric of home, the floors, walls and 
kitchen is a far bigger problem than losing ‘things’.  Nevertheless, loss of personal possessions, 
particularly those of sentimental value, inherited through family or which couldn’t be replaced, such 
as photos or paintings their children had made were the most acute losses which caused the greatest 
distress (Carroll et al., 2009).   
 
Within flooded samples, some families stay within their homes while reinstatement work is 
conducted, for a variety of reasons, and often against the advice of insurance companies or builders.  
Although this allows some people to feel more in control of monitoring the situation, many live for 
over a year with inadequate washing, cooking and heating facilities, ‚within unhealthy and unsafe 
conditions, with dust, noise and half-gutted cold dirty homes‛ (Carroll et al., 2009, p.542).  In addition, 
insurance companies often proved to be insensitive to people’s circumstances, forcing people to make 
unwanted decisions and preventing them restoring their homes as they would choose to.  Cleaning 
companies often entered properties and destroyed property unnecessarily and without permission, 
increasing the sense of lost control and loss of possessions.   Furthermore, building contractors were 
found to be exploitative of flood-affected families, cutting corners, employing illegal immigrants 
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without adequate training and using properties like public conveniences (Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008), 
with employees using other homes’ toilet facilities, and even sleeping in the beds upstairs.  
Poignantly, within similar studies, people under these circumstances report being ‘in their home’ but 
not feeling ‘at home’ (Dovey, 1985) increasing their sense of overall loss to aspects others than 
possessions.    
 
Carroll et al. (2009) also discusses that ‚staying in their own homes in these circumstances may be 
seen as a reflection of the importance, investment and attachment to home.  Home was not seen in the 
same light as prior to the flood.  The relationship to home had been changed – home as a place of 
privacy or comfort or security was breached‛ (p.542).  Although this can be the case for some 
individuals, anecdotally many of those who remain at home report doing so out of necessity; for 
example, due to the shortage of alternative accommodation, being unable to accommodate pets 
elsewhere, and was consequently no reflection of attachment to the property.  In addition, Carroll et 
al. (2009) do not accommodate for anecdotal evidence among flood-affected people that although 
living at home is logistically difficult at first, it is often the families who lived away during 
reinstatement who reported feeling less attached to their homes on their return.  In addition, some 
respondents also reported that ‚the full impact of the flood did not become apparent until after 
reinstatement when they had time to reflect.  Consequently keeping occupied seems to have delayed 
some health reactions‛ (Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008, p.144). 
 
5.0   Does distress reflect PTSD? 
In referring back to the wider literature, there is a consensus that the majority of longer-term 
problems directly relating to flooding are not physical but psychological in nature (Tapsell & 
Tunstall, 2008).  Nevertheless, some of the literature is quick to clarify that natural disasters do not 
always lead to PTSD for those affected, although stress-related symptoms are commonly reported 
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(Stout & Knight, 1990).  Studies suggest that PTSD is often but not always seen in victims of natural 
disaster (Adams & Adams, 1984; Brett & Ostroff, 1985; Malmquist, 1986) with more of those affected 
‘escaping long-term psychiatric illness’ (Stout & Knight, 1990; p.132).  Indeed the literature states that 
most disaster survivors will only experience mild stress reactions which are considered entirely 
normal in response to distressing events (NCPTSD, 2001).  However Carlier & Gersons (1995) also 
suggest that there are larger numbers of people who don’t meet full criteria for PTSD within flooded 
samples but who nevertheless require the same level of care as those who do.  Additional studies also 
note an absence of PTSD symptoms within samples affected by flooding (Schucter & Zisnook, 1984; 
Ursano & Holloway, 1985) reinforcing that the profile of reactions to flooding is not easy to predict.  
Importantly, there is a wide range of reactions that are noted within flooded populations, and 
although these are often anxiety-related, many respondents refer to loss and anger as equally salient 
in the experience (Stout & Knight, 1990) 
 
 
5.1 Understandings of criteria  
 
Despite this re-evaluation of the normality of distress following traumatic life events, studies 
disappointingly tend towards focussing upon more pathological reactions to the exclusion of other 
responses.  Carroll et al. (2009) suggests that it ‘is clear that everyone doesn’t respond in the same way 
to the same stressors and there are many manifestations of behavioural responses’ (p.540), but they 
also state that individuals ‘show acute anxiety over a short period and PTSD symptoms over a longer 
period’ (p.540).  Tapsell & Tunstall (2008) went further by documenting the proportion of clinical 




Table 1: Proportions of clinical reactions cited by Tapsell & Tunstall (2008) following flooding 
Psychological difficulty Proportion of sample experiencing it 
Anxiety at reminders of the event 59-87% 
Increased stress 35-87% 
Sleeping problems 18-87% 
Moderate depression 16-33% 
Flashbacks and nightmares Up to 53% 
Anger and severe depression 9-20% 
 
Similar symptoms were noted within the BBC Radio Cumbria Survey (2005) and the Communities 
Reunited Health Survey (2006), and were reported to occur over a period of twelve months after the 
flood (Carroll et al., 2009).   In addition, Tunstall et al. (2006) reported that 15 per cent of their flooded 
sample experienced some degree of PTSD symptoms.  They measured PTSD scores of individuals and 
reported the frequencies of the range of symptoms within the sample (shown in Table 2 below):  
 
Table 2: Proportions and severities of PTSD reactions cited by Tapsell & Tunstall (2008) 
PTSD symptoms Proportion of flood sample 
reporting these symptoms 
Non-flooded sample 
reporting these symptoms 
No symptoms 21% 35% 
Very low symptoms 49% 56% 
Low symptoms 15% 8% 
Mild symptoms 10% 2% 
Moderate / high / extreme symptoms 5%  
 
The frequencies reported in Table 2 appears to provide compelling evidence for the presence of PTSD 
within flooded samples; however when considered against DSM IV criteria for PTSD it is not clear 
from their accounts which level of symptoms actually reach this classification.  Indeed, it is possible 
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that PTSD might occur within only a proportion of the five per cent moderate/high/extreme group 
they describe and that symptoms below this point might not be eligible to be classified as PTSD at all.   
 
Related to this Carroll et al. (2009) report that, the most common symptoms reported were: ‘panic 
attacks, flashbacks, disturbed sleep, lack of motivation, unsettled and obsessive behaviour’ (p.544) 
stating their conclusion that ‘these are the symptoms associated with PTSD’ (p.544) and that ‘many 
people suffered from anxiety and stress in different forms for around a year after the floods, which 
could indicate the occurrence of PTSD or partial PTSD’ (p.544).  Unfortunately, seeming to classify 
PTSD without reference to diagnostic criteria opens studies up to criticism and suggests that they 
have not considered the potential normality of some of these responses following distressing events.  
Indeed, one individual is quoted as being ‘particularly traumatised and fought to control her 
emotions while talking about’ her experience (Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008; p.145).  However, what she 
actually reported: ‘I woke up at 1 o’clock and water was coming in downstairs... I’m sorry [tearful]... whole of 
the ground flood was gone, we hadn’t long had the house, everything was new... everything was handmade.. 
[fighting to control emotions]’ (Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008; p.145); could be considered a normal response 
to recalling a recent disaster event.  Concerningly, literature tends to deviate from normalising these 
reactions and presents such quotes as evidence of ‘traumatisation’.  Although the distress caused by 
flooding should not be minimised and it is possible for some individuals to develop a diagnosable 
PTSD reaction, it is unclear from these studies about the extent to which documented reactions could 
be normal responses to distressing life events, or indeed how studies define what they consider to be 
‘normal’ under such circumstances. 
 
In summary, although qualitative flood studies are valuable in documenting individual experiences 
and distress, by not considering the classification of PTSD, they are open to criticism, making it more 
likely that the valuable lessons from their findings are lost due to their difficulties in quantifying the 
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classifications they rely upon.  Consequently, for the purpose of this study, it might be useful to 
clarify the classification of PTSD being referred to. 
 
6.0   Clarifying Classifications 
 
The concept of psychological distress following traumatic experiences has been discussed in the 
medical and psychological literature for over a century (Dalgleish, 2004) most notably in relation to 
war veterans (Rivers, 1920) and has developed exponentially (Brewin & Holmes, 2003) particularly 
since the recognition of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a formal psychiatric disorder in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM III) (American Psychiatric Association, 1980).  Young (1995) 
highlights that the classification of PTSD has also changed over time, having developed into more 
general use and applied to everyday situations.  Although this is valuable in recognising the wider 
occurrence of traumatic events, significant debates ensue within the literature around the 
classification of the disorder. 
 
6.1 Classification of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
 
The current edition of DSM IV (APA, 2000) outlines the diagnostic criteria of posttraumatic stress 
disorder with reference to individuals being exposed to a traumatic event in which (A1) ‚the person 
experienced, witnessed or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened 
death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others‛ and (A2), in which the 
individuals’ responses ‚involve intense fear, helplessness or horror‛.  These two conditions constitute 




Following such an event, diagnosis of PTSD is then based upon presentation of symptoms from three 
distinct symptom categories:  
Criterion B symptoms associated with re-experiencing the trauma. 
Criterion C symptoms associated with avoidance of reminders or numbing symptoms. 
Criterion D symptoms associated with increased physiological arousal.  
 
Within each category, affected individuals must present with a specified number of distinct 
recognised symptoms in order to meet the diagnostic criteria.  For example, individuals must present 
with one or more symptoms which indicate that the trauma is ‚persistently re-experienced‛ after the 
event (Criterion B).  These include: recurrent and intrusive recollections of the event in the form of 
images and thoughts about the event, nightmares, flashbacks and episodes in which the individual 
believes the event is happening again, increased emotional and physiological distress on being 
reminded of the event.   
 
Avoidance and numbing symptoms (Criterion C) require presence of three or more symptoms which 
indicate ‚persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general 
responsiveness‛.  Avoidance symptoms involve avoiding thoughts, feelings, conversations, situations 
or people that arouse recollections of the trauma and inability to recall aspects of the trauma.  
Numbing symptoms also include diminished interest or participation in significant activities, feeling 
detached from others, presenting a restricted range of emotions and having a sense of a foreshortened 
future.   
 
Finally, symptoms of increased arousal (Criterion D) require two or more symptoms such as sleep 
and concentration difficulties, irritability or anger, hypervigilance to danger and an exaggerated 
startle response.  Posttraumatic stress disorder is only diagnosed following presence of symptoms for 
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more than one month and when they cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational or other areas of everyday functioning.   
 
Symptoms must also present for at least one month (Criterion E), and must cause ‘clinically 
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important area of functioning’ 
(Criterion F).  The literature also distinguishes between differences in the course of the disorder, 
classifying symptoms as acute when their duration is less than three months and chronic when 
difficulties last three months or more.  Delayed-onset PTSD is classified in instances where onset of 
symptoms occurs at least six months following the traumatic stressor. 
 
 
6.2 Differential diagnosis  
 
An important distinction in DSM IV criteria is that the classification of acute stress disorder is 
virtually identical to that of PTSD, with the main exception of the time interval of the difficulties (i.e. 
the same symptoms experienced over less than a month would be diagnosed as an entirely different 
disorder) (APA, 2000).  Although both disorders are mentioned in the literature as being observable 
in flooded samples (Waelde et al., 1998), studies do not distinguish between classifications of these 
disorders when discussing them.  In particular, the literature clearly documents that distressing 
events associated with flooding can last for between a few months to over a year in duration, 
therefore how does the literature identify the ‘index’ event within the disaster in order to establish the 
timescale for classifying PTSD rather than other stress reactions.  Consequently the PTSD 
classifications presented in the literature as rendered as potentially questionable. 
 
Furthermore, as noted in the criteria, PTSD is ‘among the few psychiatric diagnoses with embedded 
assumptions regarding its aetiology’ (Bodkin et al., 2007; p.177) with Criterion A requiring not only a 
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certain type of event but also a specific response at the time as the primary determinant of whether 
PTSD can be diagnosed or not.  If the type of event does not fulfil the definition, then diagnosis of 
PTSD is not possible, regardless of whether individuals meet every remaining criterion for the 
disorder.   
 
Unfortunately, the literature does not agree on the criteria pertaining to the nature of the event itself.  
For example, PTSD literature describes that farmers affected by Foot and Mouth disease, presented 
with posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms (Paykel et al., 2000; Peck, 2005; Olff et al., 2005; Thomas 
et al., 2003).  In the face of farmer’s experiences, such as the magnitude of loss experienced and 
exposure to burning pyres of cattle, often in close proximity to their homes, the presence of intrusive 
symptoms, numbing, hyperarousal and avoidance symptoms may be considered as hardly 
surprising.  However, opposing literature has ‘seriously questioned livestock loss as a traumatic 
event’ (Elhai et al., 2005; p.190), criticising any deviation from DSM IV criteria and suggesting that 
studies would soon be presented on ‘children ‘traumatised’ by watching their pet hamster’s death, or 
from watching Bambi die in the famous Disney movie’ (Elhai et al., 2005; p.190).   Although such 
attempts to clarify diagnostic criteria are valid, and they raise concerns that making all negative 
experiences ‘synonymous with traumatic events is trivialising the experiences of ‘real victims’’ (Elhai 
et al., 2005; p.190) they subjectively minimise the distress experienced by some people in the face of 
disastrous events.  In doing so, they suggest that depending upon the event, some people are more 
‘deserving’ of being distressed than others.  Not only is it concerning that professional perceptions 
might minimise the distress experienced in such events, but this perception is subsequently 
condemned by opposing arguments into the subjectivity of Criterion A as a diagnostic requirement 






6.3 Significance of events  
 
Despite the importance of classifying the event in terms of Criterion A, the DSM IV guidebook itself 
debates whether or not to ‘include reactions to numerous stressors that are upsetting but not life 
threatening’ (Frances et al., 1995; Olff & Gersons, 2005; p.190).  Furthermore, the other criteria for 
PTSD are in fact particularly common in other populations; for example, 78.6 per cent of patients 
being treated for major depression show Criteria B (intrusions), C (avoidance and numbing) and D 
(hyperarousal) symptoms regardless of having a history of Criterion A trauma or not (Bodkin et al., 
2007).  Furthermore the prevalence of these symptoms is virtually identical regardless of trauma 
history (Bodkin et al., 2007; Gold et al., 2005; Mol et al., 2005).  In addition, the literature contends that 
non-Criteria A events are in fact associated with greater symptom frequency of ‘PTSD symptoms’ 
(Long et al., 2008), the most notable of which included relatively common life events such as divorce 
(Creamer et al., 2005) which are not life-threatening.   
 
Consequently the literature questions whether these characteristic symptoms of PTSD are necessarily 
caused by trauma (Bodkin et al., 2007) and highlights that many of the other symptoms required for 
diagnosis of PTSD (intrusions, avoidance, emotional numbing and hyperarousal symptoms) are 
classified by DSM IV within diagnostic criteria for other disorders such as major depression, 
dysthymic disorder, generalised anxiety disorder and acute stress disorder (APA, 2000; Bodkin et al., 
2007).   
 
6.4 What does all this mean clinically?  
The literature on disasters and PTSD are of considerable clinical interest.  However their weaknesses 
generate more questions for clinical practice than they answer.  In a clinical setting, faced with an 
individual who is affected by flooding, does the presence of ‘characteristic’ symptoms of PTSD mean 
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they actually have it?  Does the event fit the criteria which currently makes PTSD a valid diagnosis for 
them, or is it ‘not traumatic enough’?  How can we objectively judge what fits Criterion A or not 
when we are looking at an event with the benefit of hindsight, with less awareness of how frightening 
or life-threatening the event might have appeared at the time?  Even if it objectively does fit this 
definition, is it actually PTSD or are the symptoms instead explained by other DSM IV classifications 
which share some of the same criteria but for different disorders?  And does the apparent severity of 
the distress mean it is ‘disordered’, or might it be a ‘normal’ response to difficult situations? 
 
In the face of all these questions it is difficult to see how a clinician might draw upon the literature for 
an answer without ending up relying upon their subjective conclusions about the event.  However at 
such times, a return to focussing upon formulation rather than getting caught up in diagnostic 
classifications might provide a clearer direction.  Unfortunately, in selecting models to guide 
formulations, we also run the risk of attaching labels to post-disaster difficulties, for example basing 
our formulative assumptions on perceiving a depressive reaction, or an obsessive-compulsive 
reaction which might be subjectively based upon clinician perceptions to the exclusion of considering 
the importance of flood experience and meanings in the development of such difficulties. 
As a clinician with personal experience of flooding, it is difficult to navigate a path through the 
literature which is clinical enough in its formulation as to generate valuable intervention strategies, 
but which is flexible enough to account for the complex interplay of factors pertaining to such an 
experience.  As a result, if this is difficult for someone with experience of it, how might clinicians 
navigate this issue without such experience for guidance?   
 
Reassuringly, suggestions within the current literature may provide valuable insight into this issue as 
Olff & Gersons (2005) highlight significant points that are relevant to the understanding and 
formulation of a variety of post-disaster reactions.  Firstly, situations are often as much associated 
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with sadness as with fear (suggesting the possibility of other emotions involved in traumatic 
reactions).  Secondly, degree of distress is dependent on subjective appraisal by the individual and 
not objective consideration of stressor severity (or predictors of this within the event, such as water 
depth).  Thirdly, any event considered sufficiently outwith someone’s control or ‚range of 
experience‛, could potentially lead to symptoms of PTSD.  Furthermore, Bodkin et al. (2007) 
questioned whether the characteristic symptoms of PTSD (intrusions, avoidance, hyperarousal and 
numbing) are caused by the trauma per se or by another mechanism, which is corroborated by the 
literature showing that characteristic symptoms of PTSD are prevalent following non-traumatic 
events (Gold et al., 2005; Mol et al., 2005).   
 
With regard to these particular points is that recent literature has presented a specific model of 
emotion generation (Dalgleish & Power, 2004) which has received interest not only in describing 
normal emotion but also PTSD (Power & Dalgleish, 2008), bipolar depression (Jones et al., 2005; Power 
& Schmidt, 2004) and eating disorders (Fox & Power, 2009).  Of relevance to flooding, the model has 
the potential to explain a variety of normal and disordered traumatic reactions, as well as providing 
explanations for the occurrence of a wide variety of trauma-related symptomatology.  Despite its 
discussion within the literature, the model receives less attention in terms of direct clinical utility in 
practice.  However, could this model be of benefit in helping clinicians to understand and formulate 
experiences of disaster events? 
 
 
7.0   Schematic Propositional Analogue and Associative 
Representational Systems – SPAARS model  
 
The SPAARS model (Dalgleish, 1999; 2004; Dalgleish & Power, 2004) is a multi-level theory of 
emotion, which encompasses many elements of other cognitive appraisal models of emotion (Oatley 
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& Johnson-Laird, 1987) but adds an additional focus to the emotional content of experiences.  
Although presented as a model for understanding reactions to traumatic experiences, and PTSD in 
particular, it is essentially a model of the development of ‘normal’ emotion, but which it offers a 
mechanism for explaining when emotion becomes ‘disordered’.  The model is therefore equally 




Figure 1: Schematic Propositional Analogue and Associative Representational Systems: SPAARS model 
(Dalgleish & Power, 2004) 
 
 
7.1 Multi-level theory of emotion: what are the levels?  
 
At a fundamental level, SPAARS proposes different levels at which information is processed and 
represented psychologically.  Firstly, the Analogical level stores information in visual, olfactory, 
auditory and other sensory forms.  The Propositional level retains representations of verbal 
information, including beliefs and ideas that can be expressed verbally.   
 
The Schematic level represents higher-level concepts which we would understand to be associated 
with existing schemas relating to models of the self, the world and others.  It is believed that these 
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cannot readily be described consciously by an individual but that they are significant in 
understanding emotional difficulties.    For example, ‘a schematic model of the world as a safe place is 
likely to contain more complexity than is captured by a simple propositional level statement such as 
"the world is safe"; rather, a model of the world as safe incorporates all aspects of what the concept of 
safety means to the individual and is a guiding construct for the way information is processed and 
organised within the system’ (Dalgleish, 2004; p.238). 
 
The Associative Level represents any automatic emotional reaction which occurs during the event but 
does not involve any appraisal at that time.  Instead, responses by this level are considered to be 
either a learnt function based on past experiences (Logan, 1988) or a biological preparedness to react 
in a certain way such as is found in animal phobias (Seligman, 1971).  Consequently, this level of 
processing is considered to be relatively inflexible to change or modification. 
 
7.2 Appraisals and Emotion Generation  
 
In contrast to other cognitive appraisal models of emotion, SPAARS proposes that there are in fact 
two routes through which emotions are generated.  Firstly, it is generated by the Associate Level of 
processing, in which emotion is generated spontaneously during an event or in response to 
experiences without any ‘online’ processing of the occurrences, but merely based on psychobiological 
arousal or conditioned responses.  This would explain, for example, why when people successfully 
overcome phobias and are able to expose themselves to feared stimuli; they will often continue to 
experience heightened arousal to the stimuli.  SPAARS suggests this is because the Associate Level 
still responds to stimuli automatically, and is not readily altered. 
 
Secondly, SPAARS proposes that events are appraised at the Schematic level with regard to the 
individual’s active life goals.  Consequently, depending upon how the event is interpreted in relation 
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to these goals, emotions can be generated.  In this level, Dalgleish & Power (2004) draw upon 
categorical theories of emotion in that they suggest the generation of basic emotions – notably 
happiness, sadness, fear, anger and disgust (Dalgleish & Power, 2004; Power & Dalgleish, 2008).  The 
proposition is that the five basic emotions are associated with distinct categories of cognitive 
appraisal and their relation to life goals (Table 3): 
 
Table 3:  Appraisal dimensions associated with basic emotions (Power & Dalgleish, 2008) 
Basic Emotion Associated Appraisal 
Fear Physical or social threat to self or valued role or goal 
Anger Blocking or frustration of goal through perceived other agent 
Sadness Loss or failure (actual or possible) of valued role or goal 
Disgust Unwanted association of person, object or idea that is repulsive to the self, and/or 
to valued roles, goals or ideals 
Happiness Successful move towards or completion of a valued role or goal 
 
Appraisals about the meaning of events in relation to life goals therefore lead to ‘existential’ emotions 
based upon the appraisal outcome.   Consequently, different emotions should be generated 
depending upon different appraisals made about obstacles which impede achievement of life goals 
(Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987).  Importantly, once generated, emotions are considered to be 
functional mechanisms which provide an attempt to reconfigure the system in order to deal with the 
appraised obstacle.   
 
Appraisals of events within this level can also increase in their complexity with further impact upon 
the emotions experienced; for example, an event which is appraised as creating an obstacle to a life 
goal would potentially generate anger in an individual; further appraisals may then become more 
sophisticated, such as attributing blame or intent for this obstacle on the part of an identifiable agent, 
which leads to increased anger.  Increasing sophistication of appraisals places more demands on the 
resources within SPAARS, potentially leading to preoccupation with the event and its related 




7.3   SPAARS and Trauma Sequelae 
 
In addition to explaining a mechanism by which emotion is generated, SPAARS seeks to explain 
characteristic posttraumatic stress sequelae using a number of novel concepts and considerations: 
 
Firstly, much like DSM IV Criterion A, SPAARS proposes that there are two significant properties of 
events which can lead to posttraumatic stress reactions: 
i) that the event is appraised as significantly discrepant from pre-existing schemas of the self 
and the world; and  
ii) that it is ‘highly emotive’, leading to intense emotional distress via either the automatic or 
appraisal-driven route, or both (Power & Dalgliesh, 2008). 
Consequently, rather than referring to objective properties of the event; SPAARS proposes the 
significance of the event’s impact upon an individual, in line with appraisal theory. 
 
SPAARS explains that when the appraisal-driven emotion is repeatedly paired with activation of 
trauma-related information, the emotion becomes further ‘automatized’ (Dalgleish & Power, 2004).  
Consequently, future encounters with information that is similar to the initial trauma (reminders of 
the event) will lead to the activation of the emotion with no further appraisal involved.   
 
 
The model then proposes that this mechanism leads to the ‘characteristic’ symptoms of PTSD in three 
ways: 
i) At the time of the trauma, information about the event is appraised as highly incompatible 
with individual’s schematic models of themselves, the world and others and is therefore 




As the unintegrated information continues to be processed, it is continually appraised as 
incompatible and threatening to existing schemas.   
 
The SPAARS system then attempts to resolve the schematic discrepancy by trying to 
accommodate the information within existing schemas.  This mechanism keeps 
representations of the traumatic event active within the cognitive system (Horowitz, 
1986) thereby leading to intrusive re-experiencing (Criterion B) symptoms.   
 
ii) These active trauma memories in the cognitive system cause repeated activation of the fear 
network, causing trauma-related information to continually intrude into consciousness.  
In addition, environmental cues related to the trauma memory also activate the fear 
network, further increasing the occurrence of intrusions.   
 
The severity of the distress caused by this intrusive phenomena leads individuals to 
engage in a number of protective mechanisms in order to avoid reminders of the trauma, 
reduce activation of the fear network and mitigate the distress they are experiencing, 
which constitute avoidance and numbing (Criterion C) symptoms.    
 
iii) As the fear network is continually being activated and reactivated (via appraisals of 
unintegrated trauma information and by multiple cueing from the environment), 
individuals remain in an almost continuous existential state of ‘being in danger’ 
(Dalgleish & Power, 2004).  This state of persistent perceived threat leads to the 




The particular relevance of the model relates to the fact that events which might not be considered 
objectively ‘traumatic enough’ to cause PTSD (for example, Foot and Mouth disease) are explained as 
having the potential to generate intense characteristic PTSD symptoms.  SPAARS’ definition of 
whether an event is ‘traumatic enough’ is different from other models of trauma experiences: it 
distinguishes events based upon the degree of discrepancy and emotion the event generates rather 
than objective traumatic elements.  This concept supports Olff & Gersons (2005) in that events 
sufficiently outwith someone’s ‘normal experience’ can be enough to generate PTSD symptoms.  
SPAARS therefore presents a model by which to explain some of the findings within the literature of 
PTSD-type reactions following distressing life events; explaining both the occurrence of symptoms in 
the face of objective traumas, and from other less traumatic events. 
 
It would appear then that SPAARS adopts a model which seeks to ‘dilute’ the diagnosis of PTSD to 
encompass a myriad of life events; however, this is not in fact the case.  SPAARS proposes that the 
‘characteristic’ symptoms of PTSD (intrusions, avoidance, numbing and hyperarousal) are merely the 
manifestations of the cognitive system attempting to reconfigure distressing experiences to fit with 
existing schemas, and as such, the occurrence of these symptoms is not considered disordered or 
pathological.  This concept is also supported by information-processing models within PTSD 
literature (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) which suggest that these symptoms occur in the majority of 
individuals to some degree following traumatic experiences.  However, the majority of people are 
able to integrate trauma-related information into their pre-existing schematic models of the world, 
themselves and others (Rachman, 1980; 2001), generally through exposure to the information within a 
supportive social network or within a therapeutic context and therefore symptoms remit.  Successful 
integration therefore involves being able to re-experience information which is incompatible to 
existing schemas in a way which allows them to ‘perceive the event as something anomalous in a 
world where their schematic models still hold a significant place’ (Dalgleish & Power, 2004; p.1083).  
This exposure weakens the link between the information held within memory and the fear network 
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(the associative level within SPAARS) by enabling the individual to experience a continual reduction 
in fear during repeated exposures.   
SPAARS would therefore not consider intrusive experiences, avoidance, numbing and hyperarousal 
as being evidence of PTSD, rather as evidence of schematic processes at work; which is a valuable 
consideration in the face of literature showing a significant degree of these symptoms in populations 
where trauma experience is absent, but where difficult life events have been encountered.  
Consequently,  SPAARS appears to have the potential to explain both the occurrence of normal and 
disordered reactions to difficult events within the same model; that regardless of degree of trauma 
experience, distress is resolved if the cognitive system fulfils its attempt to overcome the schematic 
discrepancy.  If integration of new information is not fulfilled, the difficulties become disordered 
within the classification we currently recognise as PTSD.   
 
 
7.4  SPAARS and emotional content 
 
Within the literature, understandings of PTSD rely upon the assumption that fear is the primary 
emotion underlying an individual’s PTSD reaction.  Although this seems like a sensible contention, 
the literature notes that other emotions such as sadness (Olff & Gersons, 2005) might be as significant 
within trauma experiences as fear.  Unfortunately, this is not clearly accounted for within other 
trauma models, and the difficulties relating to the profile of symptoms (i.e. sharing similarities with 
other disorders) are also not adequately explained elsewhere.  However, SPAARS also provides a 
mechanism which might accommodate these issues. 
 





1. The Emotion-non-specific component of trauma - refers to sequelae which arise as ‘a 
function of the cognitive system’s attempts to resolve the discrepancy between the 
trauma event and pre-existing schemas but which are independent of the emotional 
response that is elicited by the traumatic event’ (Dalgleish & Power, 2004; p.1072).   
This component therefore includes Criterion B re-experiencing symptoms (which occur 
as the cognitive system attempts to resolve the discrepancy) and Criterion C avoidance 
symptoms (which result as a defence against the distress caused while trauma 
information remains active).   
 
2. In current cognitive theories of trauma, events lead to the emotional response of fear 
(Criterion A), which is experienced both at the time of the event and is elicited in 
response to the re-experiencing symptoms (Criterion B).  Dalgleish & Power (2004) refer 
to this as the Emotion-specific component of trauma as it is ‘intrinsically related to the 
type of emotion elicited by the original trauma’ (p.1073). 
 
SPAARS proposes that any event which is discrepant from pre-existing schemas will result in the 
emotion-non-specific symptoms (re-experiencing, avoidance and existential affect from appraisals).  It 
also proposes that the nature of the emotion-specific symptoms is dependent on the emotions elicited 
by the event – but that these emotions are not solely predicted by the event (associative level) but also 
to the nature of the appraisal made by the individual (schematic level).  Significantly, the same event 
appraised differently by different individuals will generate different emotions.  Therefore, the model 
suggests that trauma sequelae (Criteria B, C and D symptoms) can therefore occur due to elicitation of 
other emotions than fear.   
 
This concept is novel within the literature, and in relation to these four basic emotions, Dalgleish & 
Power (2004) propose the potential for ‘a family of PTSD-like psychological reactions which resemble 
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PTSD in terms of emotion-non-specific component but which will differ in their emotion-specific 
component in ways that are dependent on the specific emotional nature of the event’ (Dalgleish & 
Power, 2004; p.1073).  Consequently, SPAARS appears to have the potential to explain the wide 
variety of reactions noted within individuals affected by traumatic experiences, particularly when 
they appear to deviate from ‘classic’ trauma reactions. 
 
7.5   Sadness and Traumatic Loss 
 
SPAARS considers that grief reactions following distressing experiences result from the cognitive 
system being unable to integrate information about loss into pre-existing schemas.  As described, 
attempts to resolve this discrepancy lead to re-experiencing, avoidance and existential emotions in 
common with PTSD reactions.  As a result, we would expect to see the similarities between PTSD and 
traumatic grief that are presented in the literature (Shuchter, 1986; Shuchter & Zisook, 1993).  
However, with grief, the dominant emotion is one of sadness in response to an appraisal of loss, 
which is experienced both at the time of the event, but also as a consequence of the re-experiencing 
symptoms.  SPAARS suggests that this constitutes the emotion-specific component of the event, 
which is independent of the emotion-non-specific component and explains why PTSD and grief 
diverge on some features, (for example that there is little evidence of exaggerated startle responses 
and hypervigilance following loss) (Jacobs, 1999; Raphael & Martinek, 1997; Schut et al., 1991).  
However, the model therefore demonstrates that two distinct disorders can be conceptualised as 
similar in their emotion-non-specific component but ‘predictably diverge from one another based on 
emotion-specific aspects as we would expect for a pathology based on sadness rather than fear’ 





7.6    Anger 
 
Whereas sadness is considered within the literature to be associated with loss (Power & Dalgleish, 
2008; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987) there is a general consensus that anger-related appraisals are 
associated with ‘blocked goals’ (Averill, 1982; Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 1999) as a result of ‘an 
identifiable agent preventing or causing the goal to be unobtainable through deliberation or 
negligence’ (Power & Dalgleish, 2008; p.318).  Within SPAARS, Dalgleish & Power (2004) propose that 
anger experienced within traumatic circumstances might share the emotion-non-specific component 
in common with PTSD and grief, involving patterns of re-experiencing, avoidance and existential 
emotions, but that the emotion-specific component would diverge where anger is felt at the time of 
the event and in response to the emotion-non-specific components.  Although these concepts are in 
their infancy, there is some support for these findings within clinical settings (Eckhardt & 
Deffenbacher, 1995).  
 
7.7   Disgust 
 
Disgust has received little clinical discussion within the literature compared to other emotions 
(Phillips et al., 1998) although has become more widely considered, particularly in how it relates to 
specific phobias (McNally, 2002).   
 
The SPAARS framework proposes the possibility of a discrepancy-based trauma related to disgust 
experienced in response to extremely disgusting events.  In this regard, emotion-non-specific 
components would again share the same features as those of anger, sadness and fear; yet emotion-
specific aspects would predictably relate to intense feelings of disgust at the time of event, and in 
response to reminders, with physiological responses related to disgust, such as feelings of nausea and 
vomiting or scanning the environment for contamination.   
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7.8   Emotion Regulation 
 
As a model of emotion, it is also the important to consider emotion regulation strategies in 
determining outcomes of distressing events.  Although a variety of alternative literature considers 
strategies such as problem-focussed and emotion-focussed coping (Carver et al., 1989) and the concept 
of emotion regulation, the SPAARS model relies on a different understanding of this.   
 
As the model fundamentally considers that emotion is a functional mechanism, with the aim of 
providing information with which to overcome obstacles (Power & Dalgleish, 2008) it relies upon the 
concept that ‘functional’ emotion regulation strategies are those which make use of the information 
provided by the emotion and ‘dysfunctional’ strategies are those which do not, or which actively 
block the emotional information (Phillips & Power, 2007).  Consequently, in common with other 
PTSD models, SPAARS considers that use of blocking strategies would result in failure to consider 
emotional information, leading to failure in overcoming the obstacle or accommodating schematic 
discrepancies, therefore further maintaining an individual’s distress (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
 
8.0  SPAARS, traumatic experiences, emotions and flooding 
 
It is of particular value to the disaster literature that a single model may comprise mechanisms by 
which to understand both normal and clinically significant distress, as well as providing a means of 
understanding the variety of possible reactions that might occur.  Anecdotally, and within the flood 
literature, there are glimpses of evidence which support SPAARS concepts.  For example, flood-
affected populations report experiencing elements of the four emotions (fear, anger, sadness and 
disgust) which Dalgleish & Power (2004) propose as being most relevant within traumatic reactions 
and SPAARS appears capable of explaining complex combinations of these emotions in relation to 
comorbid appraisals.   
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Flooded samples also clearly report the appraisals presented as being related to these emotions in the 
literature (Carroll et al., 2009; Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008), for example, fear is described at the time when 
water enters people’s houses and at times following reinstatement especially when rainfall is greater 
than usual (Carroll et al., 2009).  In addition, anger is reported towards agencies involved in the 
floods, sadness is described due to the loss of possessions and disgust is frequently a salient emotion 
for those whose homes were contaminated by sewage.  Furthermore, flooding appears to be a 
homogenous experience, yet populations resemble a group of vastly heterogeneous reactions due to 
individuals focussing on particular aspects of the event which were individually salient to them.  
Importantly, SPAARS also potentially provides a format for considering these appraisals as well as 
being able to accommodate for the absence or presence of distress at any severity. 
 
Despite being presented in the PTSD literature, SPAARS is firstly a model of emotion generation and 
schematic discrepancy, making it uniquely applicable to ‘traumatic experiences’ in which criteria for 
PTSD (or other disorders) would not be met.  Indeed the disorder in question is not even relevant.   It 
is a model whose fundamental principle is the subjective appraisal made by the individual and that 
distress in terms of some symptoms (intrusions, avoidance, numbing and hyperarousal) should not 
be considered pathological per se.  In selecting a model which has the potential to compensate for the 
vast disagreements in the literature pertaining to distressing experiences and which has clinical utility 
with regard to formulating difficulties psychologically, it therefore appears that SPAARS may be a 
valuable model to consider.  However, despite being discussed more widely within the literature in 
recent years, it is not a model that is familiar to nor seen as relevant by the majority of clinicians when 
trying to understand these experiences, potentially because of its theoretical complexity when first 





8.1 Aim of current study 
 
There is a great deal of anecdotal evidence within flooded populations suggesting the validity of 
SPAARS concepts; in fact a brief conversation with flood-affected people about their experience 
would afford most investigators with this information.  Unfortunately, there is less quantitative data 
supporting this.  The primary aim of this study is therefore to quantitatively investigate the emotional 
and psychological impact of an event such as flooding as previous studies have done qualitatively.   
In doing so, it is intended to investigate the possible presence of quantifiable evidence of SPAARS 
concepts within flooded samples in order to ascertain whether this model might be of clinical utility 




Question 1 Although distress is widely documented in the literature, to what extent do flooded 
individuals experience clinically significant symptoms or distress? 
 
Question 2 If different appraisals of an event can lead to emotions other than fear, to what extent 
do flooded samples report emotions other than fear (e.g. anger, sadness, disgust)? 
 
Question 3 If individual appraisals are more important in reflecting distress, what (if any) 
relevance do objective predictors (e.g. height of water, etc) have in flood experience?  
(i.e. are there differences in distress of flooded people related to the predictors 
investigated in previous literature?) 
 
Question 4 What evidence is there of different appraisals related to different emotions as 
outlined by the model; and if there is an emotion-specific component to people’s 
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In terms of each question, and based specifically on the SPAARS model: 
 
Question 1. 
Hypotheses:   
a. As ‘distress’ would be normal to a degree in flooded samples, it is hypothesised that a smaller 
proportion of individuals might experience symptoms of distress (on the TSI) when 
compared to the levels of distress reported in previous flooding studies. 
b. As SPAARS considers Criteria B, C and D symptoms as being ‘normal’ in resolving schematic 
discrepancies, it is hypothesised that a greater proportion of individuals will report 




a. Other emotions will be experienced during the flood in addition to fear (and possibly to the 
same degree)  
b. Other emotions will be experienced after the flood in addition to fear (and that other 







a. According to SPAARS, the meaning of the event is greater than objective predictors, and 
therefore previous predictors, including height of water, location at the time of flooding, 
insurance difficulties, should not in themselves have a significant effect on the impact of 
the event or distress measures. 
b. Based on understandings of distress within this model, those scoring highly for dysfunctional 
emotion-regulation strategies should show greater distress or impact of the event.  
c. Degrees of distress will be reduced over time (i.e. be higher in a sample flooded more recently 
than one flooded a longer time ago). 
 
Question 4. 
Qualitative hypotheses:   
a. In semi-structured interview, there should be evidence of a) the four basic emotions outlined 
(fear, sadness, anger and disgust), and b) the associated appraisals as outlined in the 
literature (threat, loss, blocked goals/negligence, repulsion). 
b. That experience of such emotions (e.g. disgust), linked to appraisals (e.g. contamination) will 







9.0  Populations  
 
Two previously flooded sites, Carlisle in Cumbria and Morpeth in Northumberland, provided 
populations for sample recruitment.  Within Carlisle, severe storms and unprecedented rainfall fell 
across Cumbria causing flooding of the River Eden and leading to extensive flooding in the City of 
Carlisle and its surrounding area in January 2005.  The flood caused damage to 1925 homes and 
businesses which endured up to two metres of contaminated water and resulted in over 3000 people 
being homeless for at least twelve months.  In addition, damage to the city’s utilities left the entire city 
and its agencies, and a total of 40,000 properties without power for more than 48 hours.  In Carlisle, 
the flood also claimed the lives of three people (Cabinet Office, 2009).   Within Morpeth, 
unprecedented rainfall exacerbated already high river levels in Northumberland and the equivalent 
of three times the monthly average rainfall fell within a 48-hour-period causing the River Wansbeck 
to flood into the town in September 2008.  The water enveloped over 950 homes and businesses 
within the town though fortunately no lives were lost (Morpeth Flood Action Group, 2009).  Two 
populations, both within the north of England and flooded three years apart therefore provided a 
unique opportunity for recruitment. 
 
10.0  Ethics 
 
Although expecting to gather a sample of distressed individuals, participants were not recruited as a 
clinical sample or identified through healthcare services; therefore only University of Edinburgh 
ethics was required and was subsequently granted (see Appendix 1).  Although NHS ethical approval 
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was not necessary, local NHS Research & Development Departments in Morpeth and Carlisle were 
contacted as a matter of courtesy (see Appendix 2).  Both departments clarified that their approval 
was not required for community sampling but reiterated the importance of informed consent and for 
participants to be able to withdraw from involvement at any time. 
 
11.0  Design  
 
Selecting from two flooded populations offered an opportunity to investigate individual emotional 
reactions following a specific traumatic event which was experienced by a number of people at a 
single interval in time.  When looking at differences in individual experience, the nature of the trauma 
is controlled for in flooded populations.  Two flooded samples also provided an opportunity to 
compare differences or similarities between two events which occurred at different times. 
 
The study comprised two design phases: firstly, an independent samples design selected samples 
from two independent flooded populations which were intended to provide a quasi-longitudinal 
design in which quantitative cohort data were available to compare traumatic and emotional 
reactions at two different stages in flood recovery.  Following this, within the second phase, a number 
of individuals were identified from their quantitative data on distress and emotional reactions to the 
event.  Semi-structured interviews were designed to gather more detailed data on flood experiences 








12.1 Design Phase One: Quantitative 
 
Within the study, three specific participant samples were sought: 
i. A sample from Carlisle which was four years post-flood – to reflect the longer term impact of 
residential flooding. 
ii. A sample from Carlisle of individuals now living within the flooded area but who did not 
live there at the time of the flood.  This sample was intended to act as a pseudo-control 
group for comparison with those flooded in Carlisle in 2005.  This group was also subject 
to perceived future threat by living within the area affected by flooding but could control 
for the effects of previous flood trauma having not been subjected to it themselves. 
iii. A sample from Morpeth which was six months post-flood – to establish the current short-
term impact of flooding, at a time when people were beginning to return to their homes 
and were within the timescale for more chronic posttraumatic difficulties. 
 
Power analyses were used prospectively to ascertain the necessary sample sizes for statistical analysis 
using a between samples t-test.  According to Clark-Carter (1997), the sample size required was n = 52 
for each of the participant groups above in order to achieve a moderate effect size (0.4) giving a 
statistical power of 0.8. 
In recruiting, participants were required to be over the age of 18 and be without a learning disability 
which might affect their ability to consent or understand the study information or questionnaires but 
no other exclusion criteria were applied during recruitment.  Within Carlisle, 32 flood-affected 
respondents completed the questionnaires and two control participants completed the study in total.  
In Morpeth, 29 respondents completed the questionnaires.  
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12.2 Design Phase Two: Qualitative 
 
At the time of consenting to the study, individuals were asked to give consent to be contacted at a 
later date in order to possibly participate in a more detailed interview about their experiences of the 
flooding.   
 
These individuals were selected based upon their scores on quantitative measures, i.e. individuals 
with the highest scores for both symptomatology and for experience of emotions either at the time of 
the flood or in the aftermath.  Depending upon the number of volunteers recruited, it was hoped to 
select at least two interview participants corresponding to each of the four basic emotions central to 
the study (i.e. two participants reporting higher anger and trauma symptoms, two reporting higher 
sadness and trauma symptoms, two reporting higher fear and trauma symptoms, and two reporting 




The following quantitative measures were presented to participants to establish their experience 
within a number of domains.  Although not intending to document PTSD symptomatology to the 
exclusion of others, some PTSD-based measures were used as they best captured the symptoms 
outlined by the SPAARS model. 
 
13.1 Underlying emotions 
 
As a measure of the underlying appraisal-driven emotions proposed by the SPAARS model 
(Dalgleish & Power, 2004), the Basic Emotions Scale (BES), (Power, 2006) was used to retrospectively 
measure basic emotions (outlined by SPAARS) experienced at the time of trauma.   
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The BES provides a list of 21 ‘emotions’, identified through factor analysis as being related to aspects 
of the five primary emotions considered in the SPAARS literature: happiness, sadness, anger, fear and 
disgust, and which combine to produce a subscale score for each of the five emotions.    Each item 
requires participants to indicate the frequency with which they have experienced the emotion on a 
seven-point scale (scoring 1 indicates never having experienced the emotion, up to a score of 7 
indicating having experienced the emotion ‘very often’).  The scale demonstrates high internal 
consistency across subscales (with Cronbach’s alpha ranging from 0.848 to 0.942) (Power & Tarsia, 
2007); and has been validated by factor analysis (Power, 2006) as well as within a number of clinical 
samples (Fox & Froom, 2009; Power, 2006).    
For the purpose of this study, two versions of the scale were adapted to account for differences in 
emotional experiences at different time points within the flood events studied:   
i. The first specifically measured emotions experienced during the flood while water was still 
within participants’ properties (BES1, see Appendix 6).  
ii. The second specifically measured emotions experienced after the flood, once water had 
subsided from their homes and insurance companies were becoming involved (see BES2, 
see Appendix 7).  
Each participant generated ten emotion subscale scores; scoring for each of the five primary emotions 
during the flood event and the primary emotions in the aftermath.  
 
13.2   Impact of the event – Emotion-non-specific component 
 
As a measure of the emotion-non-specific component of the SPAARS model (Dalgleish & Power, 
2004), the Impact of Events Scale - Revised (IES-R) (Weiss & Marmar, 1996) was adopted to establish 




The IES-R (see Appendix 8) is a 22-item self-report scale assessing subjective distress after a stressful 
life event.  The IES-R is a modified version of the Impact of Events scale (Horowitz, Wilner & Alvarez, 
1979) which did not originally measure symptoms of hyperarousal.  Both versions have been widely 
validated as measures of PTSD, however the IES-R specifically is considered a reliable tool, with high 
internal consistency (reflected in Cronbach’s alpha ranging from 0.87 to 0.91 for intrusions, 0.84 to 
0.85 for avoidance and 0.79 to 0.9 for hyperarousal) (Sundin & Horowitz, 2002) and test-retest 
reliability ranging from 0.89 to 0.94 (Weiss & Marmar, 1996).  Furthermore, the measure has 
demonstrated reliability within a variety of trauma-exposed populations (Coffey & Berglind, 2006; 
Neal et al., 1994; Sundin & Horowitz, 2003), have high correlation with other measures of 
posttraumatic stress symptoms (Weiss & Marmar, 1996) and have demonstrated clinically reliable 
cut-off scores for posttraumatic stress disorder (Beck et al., 2008; Sundin & Horowitz, 2003). 
The IES-R outlines eight items relating to experience of traumatic intrusions (such as unbidden 
thoughts, feelings or images of the event), eight items pertaining to experiencing avoidance (such as 
trying to avoid reminders of the trauma or dulling their emotional reactions to it) and six items 
related to hyperarousal symptoms (such as feeling irritable or being easily startled).  Participants are 
asked to rate the degree of distress caused by each item within the past seven days on a four-point 
scale (scoring 0 if an item is not distressing at all, to scoring 4 if the item has been extremely 
distressing).  Participants’ ratings generate a score for each subscale (taken as the mean score for 
subscale ratings) and a total IES-R score (the sum of the subscale scores). 
 
13.3 Trauma Symptoms – indicative of distress and emotion-specific component 
 
As a measure of distress and the emotion-specific component of the SPAARS model (Dalgleish & 
Power, 2004), the Trauma Symptoms Inventory (TSI) (Briere, 1996) was adopted to establish other 
symptoms associated with traumatic or distressing experiences.  
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The TSI (see Appendix 9) is a 100-item global measure of posttraumatic and psychological sequelae of 
traumatic events.  It is intended for evaluating acute and chronic symptomatology in events including 
natural disasters, and exhibits reasonable validity and reliability (Briere, 1996) as well as being a 
standardised measure with extensive population norms.  It is considered a reliable and valid measure 
with Cronbach’s alpha ranging from 0.84 to 0.87 within the subscales for both clinical and non-clinical 
samples (Briere et al., 1995; Stander et al., 2007). 
The TSI contains three validity subscales: 
1. Atypical Response (ATR) – assesses the extent to which participants are considered to over-
endorse symptoms which normative data suggested should rarely be reported regardless 
of traumatic experience.  For example, feeling one side of body going numb, losing your 
sense of taste, or seeing people from the spirit world.  Based on normative data, higher 
scores on this scale suggest individuals presenting themselves as either unusually 
symptomatic, or with psychotic symptoms, either of which are reported to invalidate the 
clinical data for an individual derived from the TSI according to the authors of the 
measure. 
2. Response Level (RL) – assesses the extent to which participants are considered to deny 
experiencing symptoms which others commonly endorse in normative data, even in the 
absence of traumatic experiences.  For example, lower back pain, aches and pains, 
wishing you had more money, and feeling tired.  Normative data suggest that higher 
scores on this scale suggest individuals presenting themselves as not experiencing typical 
symptoms found within non-clinical and general population samples.  Consequently the 
authors state that those scoring more highly on this scale are thought to be more 
defensive or avoidant, making data for an individual clinically invalid.   
63 
 
3. Inconsistent Response (INC) – assesses the extent to which individuals respond to similar 
TSI items (e.g. Item 5: getting angry about something that wasn’t important and Item 15: 
getting angry for little or no reason) in a manner that is inconsistent compared to the 
general population.  Higher scores on this scale are suggestive of random responding, 
poor attention or reading difficulties, which authors suggest will invalidate the clinical 
data on the TSI for an individual. 
Each validity subscale of the TSI has a cut-off above which the responses are considered to be 
clinically invalid (Briere, 1996): T-scores above 90 are the cut-off for Atypical Responses (ATR), above 
73 are the cut-off for Response Level items (RL), and above 75 are the cut-off for Inconsistent 
Responses.   
 
In addition, the TSI contains ten clinical subscales, measuring the extent to which participants report 
experiencing different types of trauma-related symptoms:  
a. Anxious Arousal (AA) – measures symptoms of anxiety and arousal such as 
trembling, nervousness and excessive worrying.  
b. Depression (D) – measures experiences of depressed mood and depressive thoughts, 
such as feelings of sadness and viewing the future as hopeless.  
c. Anger / Irritability (AI) – measures symptoms of angry and irritable mood as well as 
angry thoughts and behaviour, such as wanting to hurt someone and being 
argumentative. 
d. Intrusive Experiences (IE) – consists of items reflecting intrusive posttraumatic 
reactions including nightmares, flashbacks and unwanted memories.  
64 
 
e. Defensive Avoidance (DA) – reflects avoidant responses which are associated with 
the Criteria C symptoms of PTSD, such as attempts to avoid or eliminate distressing 
thoughts or memories from conscious awareness and neutralised negative emotions. 
f. Dissociation (DIS) – measures the extent that participants experience dissociative 
symptoms such as emotional numbing, cognitive disengagement and feeling out of 
touch with reality. 
g. Sexual Concerns (SC) – measures symptoms of sexual distress and dysfunction such 
as negative thoughts or feelings towards sex. 
h. Dysfunctional Sexual Behaviour (DSB) – measures experiences of sexual behaviour 
that might be considered problematic such as casual sexual contacts or with people 
who might be dangerous. 
i. Impaired Self-Reference (ISR) – measures a variety of difficulties associated with an 
inadequate sense of self and personal identity, such as difficulties understanding 
their own behaviour or inability to resist the demands of others. 
j. Tension Reduction Behaviour (TRB) – measures behaviours that an individual 
engages in to mediate negative internal states, such as externalising distress into 
suicidal behaviours, self harm or behaviours which might be considered as ‚acting 
out‛, such as aggression. 
Participants are asked to rate the frequency of each symptom experienced in the past six months on a 
four-point scale (scoring 0 if an item is never experienced, to scoring 3 if the item is experienced 
‘often’).  Scores are generated on each subscale and standardised scores are presented so that 
outcomes can be profiled against general population norms.  A standardised score of 65 or above is 
considered clinically significant for each subscale. 
65 
 
13.4 Emotional Regulation 
 
In terms of the SPAARS model, the Regulation of Emotion Questionnaire (REQ) (Phillips & Power, 
2007) was adopted as a measure of emotion regulation strategies. 
The REQ (see Appendix 10), is a 21-item self-report measure designed to assess the frequency with 
which individuals use both functional and dysfunctional emotional regulation strategies.  Functional 
strategies include those which ‘use information provided by the emotion, process the emotion 
effectively and facilitate goal-directed behaviour which promotes wellbeing’ (Phillips & Power, 2007; 
p.14).  Dysfunctional strategies are considered as those which conversely do not process emotions, 
potentially rejecting or blocking the emotion with negative consequences.  Each category of strategy 
are further subdivided into ‘internalised’ (those occurring internally within the conscious mind) and 
‘externalised’ strategies (those being directed externally or towards others). 
The measure presents five ‘internal-functional’ strategies, (including reviewing thoughts and putting 
the situation into perspective); five ‘internal-dysfunctional’ strategies, (such as dwelling on thoughts 
and making themselves feel worse); six ‘external-functional’ strategies, (including talking to others 
and focussing on pleasant activities); and five ‘external-dysfunctional’ strategies, (such as taking 
feelings out on others and trying to make others feel bad).  Participants are asked to rate the 
frequency with which they use each strategy on a five-point scale (scoring 1 for never using the 
strategy to 5 for always using it).  Participants therefore generated a score for each of the strategy 
subscales. 
The measure is relatively new compared to more widely used measures of coping strategies such as 
the COPE (Carver et al., 1989) or the Coping Inventory for Stressful Situations (Endler & Parker, 1990; 
1994) and is more coherent in terms of the emotion theories from which SPAARS has developed and 
was therefore considered to be more theoretically justified.   Furthermore, it has been reported as a 
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reliable and valid measure reflected in Cronbach’s alpha of between 0.66 and 0.76, as well as being 
highly correlated with similar emotion-focussed measures (Phillips & Power, 2007).  
 
13.5 Trauma History & Demographics 
 
In addition to formal measures, participants were asked to provide demographic data, which 
included flood-related variables, such as degree of flood damage, evacuation from their homes and 
experience of difficulties with insurance companies (see Appendix 11). 
Participants were also asked to provide information pertaining to experience of trauma prior to or 
since the flood.  Assessments of posttraumatic stress disorder usually include measures such as the 
Clinically Administered Posttraumatic Stress (CAPS) Life Events Checklist (Gray et al., 2004) as the 
literature acknowledges that experience of prior traumatic or distressing events can increase an 
individual’s risk of developing PTSD after subsequent events (Bremner et al., 1993; Breslau et al., 1999; 
Davidson et al., 1991; Foa & Riggs 1993; Kulka et al., 1990; Zaidi & Foy, 1994).  Although this checklist 
was available, the Edinburgh Traumatic Stress Centre advised against using them in non-clinical 
samples due to potentially increasing the anxiety of participants.  Consequently, participants were 
instead asked simply whether they had experienced a ‘traumatic event’ before or after the flood and 
to provide details of this if they were happy to do so. 
 
13.6  Individual groups 
 
Measures varied slightly between sampled groups.  Both the Carlisle and Morpeth groups were 
presented with measures as outlined above, while the control group measures had to be modified due 
to their not having experienced a flood event.  The survey for the control group asked individuals to 
complete questions pertaining to trauma history (without flood-related demographics), a single Basic 
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Emotions Scale pertaining to their experience of emotions within the past seven days, an Impact of 
Events Scale and a Trauma Symptom Inventory controlling for trauma symptoms in the general 
population. 
 
13.7  Phase Two Qualitative Data 
 
For the selection of individuals for further interviewing, a semi-structured interview plan (Appendix 
12) was devised to enquire about individual’s experiences of the flooding, with particular interest in: 
a) establishing the appraisals made of the salient aspects of the event,  
b) the related emotion (or combinations of emotion),  
c) qualitative information about specific intrusive experiences, avoidance, numbing and 
hyperarousal,  
d) more idiosyncratic symptoms (e.g. obsessive cleaning, aggression) which flood affected 




Flood maps of the affected areas in Carlisle and Morpeth were acquired from the Environment 
Agency, (see Appendix 3) from which affected streets were identified.  Specific addresses where 
selected randomly using random-number generating software to select house numbers which were to 
be approached within each street.  The Cumberland News and Morpeth Herald were contacted about 
publishing a short article about the research.  This was intended to generate interest, seek volunteers 
and to provide prior warning that residents might be approached to enquire if they would participate 
in the study.  However, neither the Cumberland News nor the Morpeth Herald responded to these 
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enquiries and consequently an advert was instead submitted to the papers as an alternative.  The 
Morpeth Herald provided the advert, however, the Cumberland News would not respond to any 
communication nor specifically object to the ethics of the study. 
 
Being unable to forewarn participants about the researcher calling at their addresses, it was 
considered to be intrusive to seek volunteers door to door and an alternative method of selection was 
therefore adopted.  An online format of the questionnaires was devised and leaflets explaining the 
study were instead delivered to all households that could be identified on the flood maps as having 
been affected.  Both those affected by flooding and those newly living within the area were asked to 
participate voluntarily by going to the website address provided on the leaflet (see Appendix 5).  The 
only exclusion criteria applied were that participants were to be over the age of 18, which was cited 
within the advert and within the online survey form.  Although a non-clinical sample was sought, 
participants with involvement from mental health services or taking psychotropic medication were 
allowed to participate if they felt able to do so.   
Initially, a small number of individuals responded to the advert in Morpeth, however, it became 
apparent that approaching addresses in Morpeth was not only potentially intrusive but the majority 
of homes were still undergoing extensive reinstatement work and were uninhabited, making it 
impossible to select participants based on addresses.  Instead, the local Flood Action Group was 
contacted about the research and forwarded the information on to its members to seek willing 
voluntary participants.  The group requested questionnaires which they presented to their members 
who were asked to complete the measures and return them by post if they felt happy to participate.   
Within the information leaflets (see Appendix 4 for Participant Information) all volunteers were 
informed that they could complete the questionnaires anonymously if they wished but were asked 
whether they would consent to be contacted to take part in a more in-depth interview if they were 
selected at a later date.  Volunteers who consented were asked to provide their name and contact 
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address if they were happy to do so.  All volunteers were also offered the opportunity to be entered 
into a prize draw upon completion of the questionnaires (it was suggested that for those responding 
anonymously, prize draw forms could be returned separately from questionnaire forms to prevent 
data from being identifiable).  
Once questionnaires were completed and gathered, prize draw forms (or online prize draw forms) 
were detached and kept separately to prevent identification of the questionnaires.  Where participants 
had given consent to be interviewed at a later date, consent forms and questionnaire packs for each 
individual were allocated a code number (in the event that an individual’s data was selected for later 
interview, only then were codes used to identify individuals). 
Measures were scored and subscale scores were derived or standardised based on individual measure 
guidelines.  At this point it became apparent that a minority of individuals had not completed all 
measures and were therefore extracted from the data set.  Furthermore, initial exploration of 
parametric assumptions within the data highlighted a number of outlying data points.  On further 
investigation of this, a minority of individuals who generated outlying scores were found to have 
scored within the clinically invalid range on the Trauma Symptom Inventory.  Consequently, 
participants with invalidated data were extracted from the final data set. 
After scoring the TSI and the BES measures, it was possible to identify four participants who scored 
particularly highly for each of the basic emotions (anger, fear, sadness and disgust) and whose scores 
upon the TSI also suggested higher levels of distress.  These individuals were then contacted via their 
preferred route (telephone, email or by letter) and it was explained that they had been selected for 
further interview.  Individuals were then asked to contact the researcher in order to arrange a 
convenient time for an interview to occur, but were reminded at this time that despite giving consent 
to this initially, if they no longer wished to be involved, they were able to withdraw from further 
involvement.  It was outlined that if they did not respond to the invitation within four weeks, it 
would be assumed that they did not wish to participate.  In this event it was felt that as individuals 
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were identified on the basis of greater distress, they should not be asked more than once whether they 
wished to participate.  Individuals were offered the opportunity to be interviewed in an environment 
in which they felt most comfortable.  However, when individuals either did not attend arranged 
interview appointments or failed to answer calls at an arranged home visit, they were sent a further 
communication asking whether they wished to take part (in the event that they had forgotten) after 
which no further contact was made.  Despite two of the participants making initial contacts to arrange 
further interviews, one of them did not attend the arranged interview and did not make further 
contact and one only wished to be interviewed informally and therefore no formal qualitative data 
was recorded for further analysis.  Consequently, the final phase of the study was not able to be 
fulfilled. 
 
15.0  Statistical Design 
 
Firstly, chi-square comparisons of flood demographics (such as water height, possessions lost, 
location during the flooding and during reinstatement, insurance difficulties and experiences of prior 
or subsequent traumas) between the samples were made in order to establish whether geographic 
samples differed from one another.   Subsequently, Carlisle and Morpeth samples were intended to 
be compared on a number of aspects: 
Chi-square comparisons of the frequency of clinically significant distress on the TSI and IES within 
the Carlisle and Morpeth samples were followed by a comparison of the frequency of caseness 
between the two measures.   
Emotions experienced during and after the flooding were compared between Carlisle and Morpeth 
samples.  Other emotions experienced were also to be compared with reported ratings of fear, to 
explore whether fear was the primary emotion associated with the experience or other emotions were 
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comparably dominant, as well as comparing changes in emotional ratings from the time during the 
flood to the aftermath. 
For further analyses, the IES and TSI rely upon symptoms currently experienced, therefore Morpeth 
data were extracted to more accurately reflect recent flood experience to explore the possible effect of 
flood-related variables upon event impact and distress symptoms.   
Data pertaining specifically to the use of emotion regulation strategies were also extracted to make 
comparisons between the frequency of use of strategies between Carlisle and Morpeth samples.  
Morpeth participants were divided into groups denoting high and low use of dysfunctional strategies 
to explore whether strategy use was related to impact of the event or distress symptoms.  Finally, 
comparisons between impact of the event and distress symptoms in the Carlisle sample with those in 
the Morpeth sample intended to explore whether symptoms might be perceived to reduce over the 






16.0 Descriptive Statistics 
 
16.1   Respondent Demographics from raw data 
 
Table 4: Patient Group Demographics 
Area CARLISLE MORPETH 
Group Control Flooded Flooded 
N 2 32 29 
Age Mean = 44 
Range = 25 - 63 
Mean = 51.2 
Range = 25 - 63 
Mean = 58.8 
Range = 20 - 77 
Sex Males N =1 
Females N =1 
Males N =12 
Females N =20 
Males N =11 
Females N =18 
 
In Carlisle, 600 households received a leaflet asking them to complete the survey online or to request 
a paper survey to complete by post.  34 participants (5.6 per cent) from individual addresses 
responded by completing the online survey but as there could be more than one person living at each 
address that received a leaflet about the survey, the response rate could be an overestimate. 
Of the 34 Carlisle respondents, two participants responded as part of the control group who live 
within the flooded area but who were not flooded themselves.  Unfortunately, the sample was too 
small to be used statistically and is therefore not included in subsequent data.  Consequently, the 
Carlisle flooded group consisted of 32 respondents in total. 
 
In Morpeth, 200 surveys were distributed within the local community through the Morpeth Flood 
Action Group.  A proportion of those who requested surveys subsequently admitted feeling too 
distressed to participate but no further information is available about these individuals.  A total of 29 
(14.5 per cent) people completed the survey.   
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16.2 Flood Demographics 
 
16.2.1   Height of water within flooded homes   
 
Figure 2: Variety of water heights experienced and their frequency in both flooded samples 
 
Figure 2 shows that the majority of respondents in Carlisle and Morpeth experienced flood water of 4 
feet in their homes.  Distribution of water heights in both samples also broadly reflected the 
proportions of houses affected by various water heights within both geographic areas (Cabinet Office, 
2009).  The water heights collated within Figure 2 category of ‘less than 1 foot’ ranged from a few 
inches of water to ‘dampness’ as a result of water outside the property but which did not gather 
inside.  The proportion of respondents experiencing water in their homes of greater than 3 feet 
compared to less than 3 feet did not differ significantly between Carlisle and Morpeth respondents χ² 






16.2.2 Possessions lost due to flooding 
 
All 32 participants from Carlisle reported losing their entire downstairs contents during the flood.  
Four of these participants reported also having lost one or more vehicles at the time.   
In the Morpeth sample: 25 participants (86 per cent) lost their entire downstairs contents, one of 
whom also reported having lost their car; and three participants (10 per cent) sustained property 
damage but did not lose any possessions as water damage was limited.  One participant did not 
indicate the degree of damage sustained.   The difference in degree of possessions lost between 
respondents in Carlisle and Morpeth was not statistically significant (p = 0.096, Fisher’s Exact test). 
 
16.2.3  Location during flooding 
 
    




Figure 3 reflects that the greatest proportion of participants in Carlisle stayed in their homes 
throughout the flood (50 per cent) with others either leaving by choice (25 per cent) or being 
evacuated (21.8 per cent).  One respondent reported having been on holiday and returned at the time 
of the flood and was therefore unable to access their home.   By comparison, the greatest proportion 
of participants in Morpeth left their homes through choice at the time of the flood (48.2 per cent) with 
fewer staying throughout (34.4 per cent) or being evacuated (17.4 per cent).  The proportion of 
respondents having left their homes, been evacuated or having stayed at home did not differ 
significantly between Carlisle and Morpeth respondents χ² (2) = 3.29, p = NS. 
 
16.2.4  Location during reinstatement 
 
 
Figure 4: Location during reinstatement and their frequency in both flooded samples 
 
Figure 4 shows that within the Carlisle sample, 19 respondents (59.3 per cent) reported living away 
during reinstatement and 13 (40.6 per cent) stayed at home throughout the reinstatement, compared 
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to those in Morpeth of which 25 respondents (86.2 per cent) reported living away, with 4 participants 
(13.8 per cent) staying at home during reinstatement. 
There was a significant difference between the frequency of respondents in Carlisle and Morpeth 
living away or staying at home during reinstatement χ² (1) = 5.44, p<0.05.  Based upon expected 
frequencies, more participants stayed at home in Carlisle, and more lived away in Morpeth than were 
expected.  
 
16.2.5  Insurance difficulties 
 
 
Figure 5: Experience of insurance difficulties and their frequency in both flooded samples 
 
Figure 5 demonstrates that 21 participants in Carlisle (65.6 per cent) reported experiencing a variety of 
difficulties with their insurance companies and building contractors compared with 11 people (34.4 
per cent) who had no difficulties in this regard.  Similar proportions were noted in the Morpeth 
sample, with 18 participants (62 per cent) describing difficulties with insurance and building 
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contractors compared with 11 people (38 per cent) who had no such difficulties.   The proportion of 
respondents experiencing difficulties with insurance companies did not differ significantly between 
Carlisle and Morpeth respondents χ² (1) = 0.083, p = NS. 
 
16.2.6  Experience of trauma before flood 
 
    
Figure 6: Experience of pre-flood life events and their frequency in both flooded samples 
 
When asked to disclose previous traumatic experiences at any time within their lives as an indicator 
of pre-flood PTSD risk factors, Figure 6 illustrates the frequency of the type of events reported by 
participants. Within the Carlisle sample, 4 respondents (12.5 per cent) reported experiencing 
traumatic events which fulfil Criterion A for potential to produce symptoms of posttraumatic stress 
disorder (APA, 2000).  These experiences included, a) experience of a serious road traffic accident and 
childhood cancer, b) exposure to an IRA attack in Northern Ireland, c) exposure to an earthquake in 
India, and d) experiences as a veteran of the Bosnian and Gulf Wars.  A further 7 respondents (21.8 
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per cent) reported distressing events at some time in their lives which they subjectively described as 
‘traumatic’ in nature.  However these events included experiences such as divorce, bereavement or 
stress at work, but these events did not pose a risk of death or injury and therefore do not fulfil 
Criterion A as outlined by DSM-IV.   
By comparison, within the Morpeth sample, 4 respondents (13.7 per cent) also reported Criterion A 
experiences including, a) finding their child having taken an overdose, b) serious road traffic accident, 
c) being involved in an armed arrest of an escaped offender, and d) as a pedestrian having been hit by 
a car.  A further 12 respondents (41.3 per cent) reported distressing life events including violent 
relationships, concerns about relatives who served during the Falklands War,  and childhood abuse 
but which do not constitute Criterion A events.   
The proportion of respondents reporting traumatic or difficult life events did not differ significantly 
between Carlisle and Morpeth respondents χ² (2) = 3.05, p = NS. 
 





Figure 7: Experience of post-flood life events and their frequency in both flooded samples 
Figure 7 reflects that within the Carlisle sample, 2 participants (6.2 per cent) reported Criterion A 
traumas since the flood, including, a) serious road traffic accident and b) experiences as a veteran of 
Afghanistan conflict.  A further 8 participants (25 per cent) reported distressing life events including 
divorce and bereavement.  By comparison, 2 participants within the Morpeth sample (6.8%) reported 
Criterion A traumas since the flood, involving serious road traffic accidents.  A further participant 
reported experience of distressing illness but this did not fulfil potential to generate symptoms of 
PTSD according to DSM IV (APA, 2000).   The proportions of experiences of Carlisle and Morpeth 





16.3 Descriptive Statistics - Measures 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Measures used within both populations  
 
  Area CARLISLE MORPETH 
 Group Flooded Flooded 
Subscales Score Range  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
 
Basic Emotions 




1 (not at all) – 7 (very often) 
 
4 or above indicates degree of 
clinical relevance 
Anger1 4.07 1.70 4.20 1.61 
Sadness1 3.99 1.69 3.88 1.98 
Disgust1 1.67 0.87 2.02 1.15 
Anxiety1 4.62 1.52 4.77 1.71 
Happiness1 2.68 1.56 2.56 1.52 
 
Basic Emotions 




1 (not at all) – 7 (very often) 
 
4 or above indicates degree of 
clinical relevance 
Anger2 5.08 1.73 4.94 1.29 
Sadness2 3.83 1.59 4.14 1.83 
Disgust2 1.56 0.70 2.21 1.47 
Anxiety2 4.74 1.72 5.15 1.60 
Happiness2 3.79 1.62 3.10 1.43 
 
Impact of Events 




1 (not distressing) – 4 (extremely 
distressing):  
 
>2 on subscales / >6 on IES Total 
indicates clinical relevance  
Avoidance 0.92 0.85 1.27 0.91 
Intrusion 1.0 0.95 1.71 0.99 
Hyperarousal 0.83 0.89 1.51 0.92 








1 (never use) – 5 (always use 
strategy) 
 
>3 suggests high use of strategy 
Internal-Dysfunctional 1.94 0.63 1.91 0.74 
Internal-Functional 3.11 0.69 2.91 0.34 
External-Dysfunctional 1.33 0.26 1.39 0.34 









Standardised scores range from 35 
to 100 
Invalid scores:  ATR >90, RL >73, INC 
>75  
Atypical Responses ATR 50.93 12.12 49.38 8.97 
Response Level  
RL 
46.51 9.72 44.55 7.76 
Inconsistent Response  
INC 






Raw scores 0 (never experienced) – 
3 (often experienced) 
 
Standardised scores range from 35 
to 100 
 




52.29 11.39 59.83 13.3 
Depression 
D 
52.22 8.98 58.76 12.25 
Anger / Irritability 
AI 
49.16 8.08 56.31 10.89 
Intrusive Experiences  
IE 
54.54 12.10 55.65 10.38 
Defensive Avoidance  
DA 
52.58 9.64 54.14 9.46 
Dissociation 
DIS 
57.03 14.20 58.45 14.49 
Sexual Concerns 
SC 
49.71 8.48 50.52 8.63 
Dysfunctional Sexual 
Behaviour DSB 
45.64 2.23 47.03 4.66 
Impaired Self Reference 
ISR 
54.06 12.22 57.52 13.73 
Tension Reduction Behaviour 
TRB 
47.74 6.62 53.03 9.37 
 
Table 5 presents means and standard deviations for all outcome measures presented to Carlisle and 
Morpeth samples.  Sample score ranges and clinically significant cut-offs are presented for 




17.0   Exploration of assumptions for analyses  
 
Firstly, in investigating the data visually, a number of participants did not complete all measures and 
were therefore extracted from the data set.   
 
17.1 Assumption of Normal Distribution 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov analyses were used to establish whether the Carlisle and Morpeth samples 
violated the assumption of normal distribution and therefore whether data can be used in parametric 
analysis.   To control for the potential increase in Type I error rate due to multiple testing over a 
number of variables, the required alpha level was adjusted to a more stringent level using the 
Bonferroni correction; the standard alpha level (p<0.05) in which normality was tested for 31 data 
variables per sample would need to be adjusted to a significance of p<0.0016 in order for samples to 
be considered significantly different from a normal distribution.  (See Appendix 13 for K-S test 
statistics).  K-S analysis for Carlisle and Morpeth samples showed that all variables were not 
significantly different from a normal distribution based on the adjusted alpha level. 
  
17.2 Exploring skewness and kurtosis 
 
To explore the sample distributions in more detail, the degree of skewness and kurtosis was 
calculated (see Appendix 14 for Carlisle skewness and Appendix 15 for Morpeth skewness). 
 
The Carlisle sample showed greater overall skewness reflected in more variables reaching 
significance for skewness than the Morpeth sample, which was potentially reflected in the low 
response rate and greater potential for a highly self-selected sample within Carlisle.  The Morpeth 
sample however appeared to be more representative and varied in those who chose to participate, 
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reflected in fewer significantly skewed distributions compared to Carlisle.  Due to the degree of skew 
for both samples, the data were subjected to natural log transformation.  However, this had no effect 
and therefore raw data are presented.   
Stem-and-leaf plots of the data identified a number of outliers with particularly high scores within the 
validity measures of the Trauma Symptoms Inventory.  Importantly, the TSI outlines clinical cut-off 
points above which participant responses are considered to be clinically invalid.  Closer examination 
of these individuals’ scores also showed that those generating outlying values above the clinically 
valid cut-offs for the TSI also generated outlying scores on other measures with the potential to 
significantly skew the data set.  Consequently, data pertaining to individuals who produced 
invalidated outliers (n=4) were extracted from the data set before proceeding with further analyses.  
This reduced the Carlisle sample to 31 participants and the Morpeth sample to 26. 
 
17.3 Assumption of Homogeneity of Variance 
 
 
As part of the analysis of flood data involved comparison of two independent groups, the Levene’s 
test for homogeneity of variance between these two groups was conducted to ascertain whether the 
assumption of equal variances between these groups was upheld (see Appendix 16 for test statistics). 
 
Based upon an adjusted significance for multiple testing (p<0.0016), only two variables were 
significantly different in their variance between both groups; variance for disgust scores pertaining to 
the aftermath of flooding were significantly different F (1,50) = 15.60 p<0.0001; as were scores for use 
of internal-functional emotion regulation strategies, F (1,50) = 14.82 p<0.0001.   
However, as the majority of measures reflected distributions of equivalent variance, deviation from 
this in the anomalous variables may reflect specific deviations in participant responses on these 
measures (for example, disgust ratings are difficult to accurately achieve due to the nature of the 
measure).    Therefore, as the majority of variables fulfilled the assumptions of normal distribution 
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and homogeneity of variance, it was assumed that both flooded samples could be appropriately 
subjected to parametric testing. 
 
18.0   Investigating Study Hypotheses  
 
18.1 Question 1 – Degree of clinically significant distress 
 
18.1.1  Hypothesis a)   A smaller proportion of individuals might experience symptoms of 




Figure 8: Frequency of participants reaching clinical caseness (over 65) on standardised scores for each of 
the subscales of the Trauma Symptom Inventory for both samples 
 
Figure 8 reflects the number of both Carlisle and Morpeth respondents who reached clinical 
significance on the Trauma Symptom Inventory (TSI) subscales.  Looking more closely at the 
depression subscale for example, (which is easier to draw comparisons with previous literature 
regarding specific depression symptoms), 8 out of the 26 respondents from Morpeth (30.7 per cent) 
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obtained a score suggesting clinically relevant depression, compared to 2 out of the 31 respondents 
from Carlisle (6.4 per cent) with clinically relevant depression scores.  The score for depression within 
the Morpeth sample is therefore comparable with the highest prevalence of moderate depression 
reported in previous literature (16-33 per cent) (Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008).  The greatest frequency of 
clinically relevant scores in the Carlisle sample occurred for symptoms of dissociation (n=6 or 19.3 per 
cent respondents), compared to 8 respondents (30.7 per cent) scoring within the clinically relevant 
range on this subscale from the Morpeth sample. 
It would appear that a considerable number of participants reported experiencing clinically 
distressing symptoms.  However, it is unclear from these data how many actual individuals this 
affects (for example, are the same 8 respondents in Morpeth experiencing clinically relevant 
depression and dissociation, or are there in fact 16 individuals, of which 8 experience depression 
symptoms and 8 experience dissociation?)  To clarify this question, it is potentially more useful to 
judge distress based upon how many individuals experience clinically relevant symptoms on more 
than one subscale (see Figure 9 below). 
 




Figure 9 presents the frequency with which individuals produce clinically significant scores on more 
than one subscale, of which it is evident that the greatest frequency of Morpeth participants (15.3 per 
cent) report clinical significance on one subscale and the greatest frequency of Carlisle participants 
(16.1 per cent) report clinical significance on two subscales.  However, the difference in Carlisle and 
Morpeth samples in the number of individuals with two or less clinically relevant subscale scores and 
three or more clinically relevant scores was not statistically significant (p = 0.696, Fisher’s Exact test). 
Nevertheless, 53.8 per cent Morpeth sample (n=14) reach caseness on one or more variables, reducing 
to 38.4 per cent of the total sample (n=10) reaching significance on two or more variables.  This would 
appear to suggest that overall distress based upon two or more clinically symptomatic variables 
remains comparable with rates of distress found in previous samples (Department of Health, 1998). 
 
The Department of Health (1998) reported that 34 per cent of samples studied continued to have 
difficulties (as measured by the General Health Questionnaire) even after all reinstatement was 
completed, which is broadly comparable with the Carlisle sample within this study.  32.3 per cent of 
Carlisle participants (n=10) generated clinically significant scores on one or more variables on the TSI 
which would appear to be broadly comparable with previous estimates, although it is not possible to 





18.1.2  Hypothesis b) A greater proportion of individuals will experience clinically 
relevant symptoms of impact on the IES compared to levels of distress on the TSI  
 
Figure 10: Frequency of participants reaching clinical caseness (over 2) on subscales or caseness on Total IES 
scale (over 6) on the Impact of Event Scale for both samples 
 
Figure 10 reflects that a number of both Carlisle and Morpeth respondents reach clinical significance 
on the Impact of Events subscales.  The greatest frequency of Morpeth participants (14 respondents, 
53.8 per cent) report clinically relevant intrusions scores compared with 6 respondents from Carlisle 
(19.4 per cent) reporting clinically significant levels of intrusions.   Despite apparent differences 
between frequencies for Carlisle and Morpeth, the number of individuals with clinically relevant 
avoidance and intrusions (p = 0.509, Fisher’s Exact test) or hyperarousal and IES Total scores (p = 
0.555, Fisher’s Exact Test) were not significantly different.  Interestingly, results from both the IES and 
TSI suggest that the proportion of those experiencing clinically significant impact and distress do not 
differ significantly between groups who experienced flooding four years ago compared to those who 
experienced more recently. 
As previous studies have not specifically measured these IES variables (and as many of them classify 
them as indicative of PTSD alone), it is not possible to directly compare the proportion of those 
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affected in these flooded samples with samples from previous literature.  However, literature 
suggests that in disaster samples, PTSD prevalence or related distress is approximately between 32 
per cent (de la Fuente, 1990) and 29 per cent (Norris et al., 2001).  In considering the IES total score as 
reflective of overall PTSD symptomatology, 8 participants from Morpeth (30.8 per cent) and 3 
participants from Carlisle (9.7 per cent) fall within the clinically significant range.  Consequently, it 
would appear that Morpeth participants are comparable with previous studies into the prevalence of 
symptoms that are characterised as posttraumatic in nature. 
In addition, in terms of the SPAARS model, it would also be hypothesised that a greater proportion of 
participants should experience higher IES scores (as is related to normal resolution of discrepancies) 
than should experience TSI scores (related to psychological difficulties). 
For ease of comparison between these two measures, the total IES score (mean of impact scores) was 
compared against a mean score calculated for TSI subscales (mean of psychological distress scores).  
Carlisle and Morpeth samples were combined into one sample which was divided into ‘low’, 
‘moderate’ and ‘high’ scorers upon each scale (see Figure 10): ‘Low’ scores on IES total referred to 
means of 0-3 inclusive, ‘moderate’ scores referred to means greater than 3 to less than 6, and ‘high’ 
scores were means greater or equal to 6 (indicative of clinical significance).  In addition, ‘low’ scores 
on the TSI referred to mean scores less than or equal to 55, ‘moderate’ scores referred to those greater 
than 55 or less than 64 inclusive, and ‘high’ scores referred to means of 65 or greater (indicating 
clinical significance.)   
A number of data points were missing for both the IES (n=7 incomplete) and TSI (n=6 incomplete) 





Figure 11: Comparison of frequencies of low, moderate and high scores on IES and TSI for combined sample  
 
Figure 11 visually represents that scoring ‘low’ on the TSI was notably more frequent than scoring 
low on the IES, suggesting that impact scores might tend to be higher than TSI scores.  Furthermore, 
more participants within the moderate and high categories scored highly on the IES than on the TSI.  
Importantly, χ² comparison of these frequencies suggests a significant difference between the groups; 
χ² (2) = 10.997, p < 0.005 (where frequency of high IES scores was greater than expected) suggesting 
that Criteria B, C and D symptoms within DSM IV are significantly more common than other 





18.2 Question 2 – Emotions associated with flooding 
 
18.2.1  Hypothesis a)   Other emotions will be experienced during the flooding in addition 
to fear (and possibly to a similar degree)  
 
 
Figure 12: Mean ratings of basic emotions during the flood for both samples  
 
Figure 12 suggests little difference between Carlisle and Morpeth samples in terms of each emotion 
experienced at the time of flooding.  Indeed, there were no significant differences between the 
samples on emotions: (anger t (93) = 0.353, p>0.05; sadness, t (93) = 0.187 p>0.05; anxiety t (93) = 0.198 
p>0.05 and happiness t (93) = 0.761 p>0.05).  The only exception was that disgust during the flood 
rated by Morpeth participants, was significantly higher (mean = 2.033) than for Carlisle participants 
(mean = 1.644), t (93) = 2.241 p<0.05.  However with an adjusted significance for multiple testing (n=5) 




18.2.2  Hypothesis b)    Other emotions will be experienced after the flooding in addition 
to fear (and possibly to a greater degree in the aftermath). 
 
Figure 13: Mean ratings of basic emotions after the flood for both samples  
 
 
Figure 13 also demonstrates little difference between Carlisle and Morpeth samples in their emotions 
experienced after the flood.  Indeed independent samples t-tests (Appendix 18) showed no significant 
difference between samples on emotions experienced: (anger t (93) = 0.862 p = NS; anxiety, t (93) = 
1.383 p = NS or happiness t (93) = 1.703 p = NS).  The Morpeth sample showed significantly higher 
sadness ratings after the flood than the Carlisle samples; t (93) = 2.144 p<0.05, although adjustment for 
multiple testing rendered this difference non-significant.  However, disgust was significantly higher 
within the Morpeth sample (mean = 2.175) compared to the Carlisle sample (Mean = 1.521); t (93) = 
4.915 p<0.001 despite the adjusted significance level. 
Secondly, literature has suggested that difficulties within the aftermath can be more significant that 
the event itself and we might therefore expect emotion ratings to at least remain as high if not 
increase in the aftermath.  Paired samples t-tests demonstrated no significant change in ratings of 
anger t (94) = 1.775 p = NS or anxiety t (94) = 0.057 p = NS between the flood and the aftermath.  When 
significance was adjusted for multiple testing, there was also no significant change between feelings 
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of sadness t(94) = 2.542 p = NS or disgust t (94) = 0.057 p = NS between the event and the aftermath.  
However, happiness increased significantly between the event (mean=2.74) and the aftermath 
(mean=3.54) t (94) = 6.484 p<0.001.  Therefore it appeared that negative emotions did not increase in 
the aftermath as previous literature might suggest but that they remain consistent, with only 
happiness increasing significantly once the event is over (see Appendix 18). 
 
18.3 Question 3 – Effects of personal / flood variables 
 
18.3.1  Hypothesis a)  Flood variables will not have a significant effect on impact or 
distress measures 
 
In terms of test measures, the TSI and IES reflected current symptomatology, but the Carlisle sample 
had more time for symptoms to remit than the Morpeth sample.  Consequently, for the purpose of 
looking more closely at flood-related variables, Carlisle sample data were considered less reflective 
and therefore Morpeth data were used exclusively in the following comparisons.  As the Morpeth 
sample fulfilled the assumption for normal distribution, parametric analyses were adopted. 
 
18.3.1.1   Height of water 
 
When Morpeth data were divided by experience of flood water of 3 feet or less (n=15) compared with 
4 feet or more (n=8) there were no significant differences between emotions experienced during the 
flood, emotions experienced after the flood, scores for intrusions, avoidance or hyperarousal or mean 






18.3.1.2   Location during flooding 
 
When Morpeth data were subdivided into those who left their homes during the flood (n=14) 
compared with those who stayed in their homes (n=9) no significant differences were found between 
emotions experienced during the flood, emotions experienced after the flood, scores for intrusions, 
avoidance or hyperarousal or mean TSI score (see Appendix 20 for analysis data). 
 
18.3.1.3   Location during reinstatement 
 
When Morpeth data were divided into those who left their homes during the reinstatement (n=3) and 
those who stayed in their homes (n=20), it was not possible to make a statistical comparison between 
the groups.  The study therefore cannot quantitatively explore whether location during reinstatement 
had an impact upon post-flood distress.  
 
18.3.1.4   Insurance Difficulties 
 
When Morpeth data was divided into those who experienced difficulties with insurance companies 
(n=15) compared with those who didn’t (n=8) there were no significant differences between emotions 
experienced during the flood, emotions experienced after the flood, scores for intrusions, avoidance 
or hyperarousal or mean TSI scores, (see Appendix 21 for analysis data).  
 
18.3.1.5   Trauma before the flood 
 
When Morpeth data was subdivided into those who experienced Criterion A events before flood 
(n=4), distressing life events before flood (n=8) and those who experienced no pre-flood difficult 
events (n=11) it was not possible to make a statistical comparison between the groups.  The study 
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therefore cannot quantitatively explore whether trauma before the flood had an impact upon post-
flood distress.  
18.3.2  Hypothesis b)    Dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies will have a significant 
effect upon impact and distress compared with flood variables 
 
 
Figure 14: Frequency of use of emotion regulation strategies, in terms of low versus high use for both 
samples.    
 
Strategies were subdivided into the measured subscales (i.e. internal-dysfunctional, internal-
functional, external-dysfunctional and external-functional strategies) and further categorised into 
those who rate low use and those who rate high use of each (based upon a score of less than 3 
indicating ‘low’ use and 3 or greater indicating ‘high’ use).   
 
Despite some visual differences, Carlisle and Morpeth samples did not differ significantly in the 
frequencies of reporting use of internal-dysfunctional strategies (p = 0.24, Fisher’s Exact test); internal-
functional strategies (p = 0.31), external-dysfunctional-strategies (p = 1.0) or external-functional 
strategies (p = 0.58) showing general consistency between the samples in how affected populations 
tend to regulate affect. 
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It was hoped that use of strategies could be analysed statistically to explore whether use of emotion 
regulation strategies were predictive of post-flood distress, however there were too few data from the 
Morpeth sample for statistical comparisons to be possible.   
 
18.3.3  Hypothesis c)    Distress should reduce over time (therefore be significantly higher 
in a sample flooded more recently). 
 
Within this study, Carlisle data were gathered as a pseudo-longitudinal comparison group to 
compare with more recent experiences in Morpeth.  As noted, Carlisle and Morpeth did not differ 
significantly in terms of the emotional experience they reported during or after the flood, suggesting 
relatively similar flood experiences.   
However, when impact and distress scores were compared directly, analysis of variance showed that 
although Carlisle and Morpeth samples do not differ significantly in terms of ratings of avoidance on 
IES F (1,55) = 2.745 p = NS, the samples differed significantly in terms of ratings of intrusions and 
hyperarousal on IES and overall TSI mean scores.   
Specifically, the Morpeth sample showed significantly higher intrusions (mean = 2.28) compared to 
Carlisle (mean=1.73) F (1,55) = 6.382 p<0.05; significantly higher hyperarousal (mean = 2.07) compared 
with Carlisle (mean =1.56) F(1,55) = 6.661 p<0.05; and significantly higher TSI mean scores (mean = 
57.74) compared with Carlisle scores (mean = 53.090) F(1,55) = 6.347 p<0.05, suggesting that if the 
samples were comparable at the time of flooding, it would appear that distress reduces significantly 
over time since the event (see Appendix 22). 
 
18.4 Question 4 – Qualitative Interviews 
 
The final aim of the study was to identify participants with high scores for emotional experience and 
distress to qualitatively explore possible relationships between these variables.  However it was only 
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possible to identify four participants who had consented to further interviewing and only one 
respondent agreed to participate but was uncomfortable about being formally interviewed. 
Consequently, no data are available for further qualitative enquiry and it was not possible to fulfil 





















19.0 Summary of findings  
 
Comparison of Carlisle and Morpeth samples showed no differences between groups in terms of 
variables such as water height, possessions lost, being at home or evacuated during flooding, 
difficulties with insurance companies or experience of traumatic events prior to or since the flood.  
However, more participants stayed in their homes during reinstatement in Carlisle than stayed at 
home within the Morpeth sample and the Morpeth sample reported significantly greater feelings of 
disgust after the flood than Carlisle participants. 
On the Trauma Symptom Inventory there was no difference between Carlisle and Morpeth in the 
proportion of clinically significant scores.  Over half of the Morpeth sample reached clinical 
significance on one or more measures of distress, and over a third on two or more variables.  In 
addition, over a third of Carlisle participants generated clinically significant scores on one or more 
variables despite four years passing since the flood occurred.   
There was no difference between Carlisle and Morpeth on Impact of Events subscales which reflect 
characteristic PTSD sequelae (intrusions, avoidance or hyperarousal).  However, both samples 
demonstrated significantly more high impact scores (IES) compared to other psychological symptoms 
of distress (TSI).   
Carlisle and Morpeth did not differ in terms of their emotional experience during or after flooding, 
with anxiety, anger, sadness and disgust all reported during these times.  In the aftermath of flooding, 
emotions reported did not change significantly, but happiness ratings increased significantly once 
flooding had subsided.  
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Within the Morpeth sample, findings suggested that there were no significant differences in emotions 
experienced, IES scores or TSI symptoms based upon differences in flood variables.  There were also 
no differences in distress between those who had experienced Criterion A events, compared to 
distressing life events or no pre-flood difficulties.  Nevertheless, despite no differences between 
Carlisle and Morpeth samples, distress measured by the TSI and IES suggested reduced symptoms in 
the Carlisle sample, suggesting recovery over time. 
Finally, there were no differences in emotion regulation strategies between Carlisle and Morpeth 
samples, with higher use of functional strategies (both internal and external) compared to 
dysfunctional strategies and greater use of internal compared to external strategies.  However, high 
use of internal-dysfunctional strategies were related to significantly higher reports of intrusions, 
hyperarousal and distress measures on the TSI compared to low use of these strategies.      
 
19.1 Findings related to study hypotheses and previous literature 
19.1.1  Question 1: Hypothesis a) A smaller proportion of individuals might experience 
clinically relevant symptoms of distress on the TSI when compared to the  levels of 
distress reported in previous flooding studies 
 
Previous studies provide a variety of prevalence estimates for depression, anxiety and PTSD in 
flooded populations, (de la Fuente, 1990; Norris et al., 2001; Tapsell & Tunstall, 2008) many of which 
suggest difficulties in a considerable proportion of samples studied.  Department of Health (1998) also 
indicated that 34 per cent of flood-affected individuals displayed clinically significant impairment in 
psychological health on measures such as the GHQ-12, even after all reinstatement was completed, 
which was higher than would be expected for the population in general (Department of Health, 1998).  
However, due to concerns about over-classification of disorders or over-pathologising of potentially 
normal distress, this study identified only those who scored within the clinically significant range for 
distress.  As such, it was considered that Carlisle and Morpeth samples might show a comparatively 
reduced prevalence of symptoms on the TSI.  Findings in fact reflected that both flooded samples 
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were broadly comparable with Department of Health (1998) estimates and suggested detrimental 
effects of flooding upon psychological wellbeing to some degree above that expected within the 
general population.   
Although clinically significant scores were more prevalent than expected and therefore did not 
support the hypothesis, it was valuable to have found this within a study which was not seeking to 
pathologise post-flood distress.  Consequently, findings indicate that flooding is an event in which a 
considerable number of those affected might experience clinically significant levels of distress in some 
form.  However, identification of specific causes or nature of distress was not possible from these 
data; and it is difficult to identify from TSI subscales whether caseness on one scale is sufficient to 
consider difficulties to be of actual clinical relevance, or indeed how many subscales would need to 
reach caseness for this to be the case.  Caution is therefore applied in suggesting the diagnostic nature 
or presentation of the distress identified.   
 
19.1.2  Question 1: Hypothesis b) A greater proportion of individuals will experience 
symptoms of impact on the IES compared to levels of distress on the TSI  
 
Previous literature suggests that in disaster samples, prevalence of posttraumatic distress is estimated 
at around 30 per cent (de la Fuente, 1990; Norris et al., 2001).  Although not seeking to establish 
existence of PTSD, this study compared such prevalence against individual Total IES scores 
(indicating the overall presence of symptoms ‘characteristic’ of PTSD, i.e. intrusions, avoidance and 
hyperarousal symptoms).  In this regard 30 per cent of the Morpeth sample fell within the clinically 
significant range which was comparable with previous prevalence estimates.  However, the SPAARS 
model presents these symptoms as being related to schematic adjustment and discrepancy resolution 
(Dalgleish & Power, 2004; Power & Dalgleish, 2008) and symptoms were therefore not considered in 
this study as indicating the presence of PTSD per se.  Consequently, considering these symptoms to 
be more ‘normal’ when compared to more ‘disordered’ reactions (as measured by the TSI), it was 
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hypothesised that a greater proportion of participants should experience higher IES scores (related to 
normal adjustment) than should experience TSI scores (related to psychological difficulties).   
Although this hypothesis was driven by theoretical concepts and not supported by previous 
literature, there was a significantly greater proportion of high IES scores compared to high TSI scores, 
and significantly fewer low IES scores compared to low TSI scores within this study.  This 
discrepancy tentatively supported the SPAARS hypothesis, suggesting that Criteria B (intrusions), C 
(avoidance and numbing) and D (hyperarousal) symptoms within DSM IV (which SPAARS presents 
as being related to normative schematic recovery) are found to a greater degree than other 
posttraumatic measures of distress.  This would appear to go some way towards supporting the 
SPAARS suggestion that common occurrence of impact does not equate to common occurrence of 
disorder, which is not accounted for in the bulk of current PTSD literature.  Unfortunately from these 
data, it is not possible to draw definitive conclusions on the nature and functions of reported impacts 
in terms of the SPAARS framework.  Nevertheless, equal caution should be given to the conclusions 
drawn within previous literature about the presence of impact symptoms being indicative of PTSD 
and although findings might suggest normalisation of post-disaster reactions, they do not suggest 
that genuine posttraumatic stress is not a possible outcome of flood experience. 
 
19.1.3  Question 2: Hypothesis a) Other emotions will be experienced during the 
flooding in addition to fear (and possibly to a similar degree)  
 
There is little previous literature on the nature of emotions experienced at the time of flooding, and 
there is particular emphasis upon retrospective feelings towards the event derived from subjective 
clinical assumptions.  In addition, previous literature focuses on posttraumatic stress reactions, which 
DSM-IV defines as an anxiety-disorder (APA, 2000) thereby negating experience of other emotions.    
However, the SPAARS model hypothesises that emotions other than fear might feature significantly 
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within traumatic experiences and therefore poses a challenge to previous literature about the 
emotional nature of such events.  
Interestingly, findings suggested that all four negative basic emotions: anger, fear, disgust and 
sadness, featured during flood experiences, which goes some way to supporting the SPAARS 
hypothesis that other emotions than just fear might be significant during flood experiences.  Sadness 
and disgust did not feature as dominantly as the SPAARS model might have expected, however it is 
not possible to ascertain whether this is due to the nature of the event and whether anxiety and anger 
might just be more pertinent to these two flood samples.  However, findings at least suggest that 
other emotions are not adequately understood within trauma reactions and should be the focus of 
further research. 
 
19.1.4  Question 2: Hypothesis b) Other emotions will be experienced after the flooding 
in addition to fear (and possibly to a greater degree in the aftermath)  
 
In the same way, SPAARS would hypothesise that after the flood, emotions other than anxiety might 
also feature significantly. Previous flood literature also suggests that emotional experience might be 
greater in the aftermath of flooding (Green et al., 1985; Parker et al., 1983; Tapsell & Tunstall, 2001, 
2008; Tunstall et al., 2006) and it was hypothesised that other emotions might play a more significant 
role in the aftermath than during the event.   
Again findings reflected that after the flood, all four negative basic emotions were experienced and 
were in fact slightly elevated compared to during the flood.  However, only fear and anger featured 
dominantly, making it unclear whether sadness and disgust are less dominant following disasters or 
whether they were just less significant within these samples than they might be in others.   
In addition, previous literature suggesting that the aftermath can be a more emotional time was 
tentatively supported by findings that negative emotions did not change significantly after the flood 
and were in fact slightly increased, suggesting that the ongoing emotional turmoil following flooding 
101 
 
can be as difficult as the flood itself.  However, despite prolonged negative affect, ratings of happiness 
increased significantly once the event was over.  Consequently, increased negative emotions were 
combined with increased positive experiences in the aftermath and therefore might reflect a more 
complex emotional picture than previous literature accounts for.  In addition, although it is 
understandable why individuals would report feelings of anxiety, it is interesting but less clear as to 
why individuals experienced anger so dominantly both at the time and within the aftermath.  
Anecdotally, those affected by flooding spontaneously describe sadness far more than anger and it 
would therefore be valuable to ascertain the nature of the anger experienced, particularly in how it 
might relate to appraisals made at the time. 
 
19.1.5  Question 3: Hypothesis a) Flood variables will not have a significant effect on 
impact or distress measures 
 
The majority of previous literature documents potential differences in disaster variables and their 
impact on distress; including the effects of evacuation and financial loss (Bland et al., 1996), severity of 
exposure (Jordan et al., 2004; Neria et al., 2006; Schlenger et al., 2002) and degree of property 
destruction (Neria et al., 2008; Norris et al., 2004).  However some authors highlight that findings are 
at best inconclusive (Norris et al., 2004) and potentially contradictory (for example, in terms of distress 
related to previous experience of disasters) (Bland et al., 1996; Norris & Murrell, 1988).  It is therefore 
unclear how these variables affect distress and do not consider the value of meanings of events 
derived by individuals (Norris et al., 2004; Olff & Gersons, 2005).  However, the SPAARS model 
hypothesises that variables do not take account of individual’s experience or appraisals of events and 
therefore should not be able to predict distress or impact measures.  Consequently, it was 
hypothesised that findings would not support previous literature of the effects of variables and that 
no significant differences in distress would be found based upon these predictors.   
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Due to limited data, it was not possible to make statistical comparisons as to the impact of location 
during reinstatement and experience of traumatic events before the flood.  However there were no 
significant differences in reactions or emotions based upon height of flood water, having stayed or 
left home during flooding, or whether they experienced insurance difficulties.  Available findings 
were therefore contradictory to previous literature and went some way towards supporting the 
SPAARS-based hypothesis.  Unfortunately, exploring a direct linear relationship between 
environmental factors such as water level and degree of distress is conceptually flawed.  There is no 
way of knowing the level threshold above which water level might have an impact on distress, and 
although this study adopting such an approach in this study, it has highlighted that comparisons of 
this nature are often meaningless.  Nevertheless, they have occurred widely within previous literature 
(Bland et al., 1996; Neria et al., 2008; Norris et al., 2004).  Consequently, the SPAARS’ focus upon 
individual experience, appraisals and schematic discrepancies as a mediator of distress may be a 
more valuable conceptualisation for post-disaster samples, based upon variables other than those 
provided by the event itself. 
 
19.1.6  Question 3:  Hypothesis b)  Dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies will have 
a significant effect upon impact and distress compared with flood variables 
 
Despite flood variables not predicting distress, the SPAARS model would suggest that emotion 
regulation strategies should be related to differences in distress experienced.  There is also some 
support for this contention based upon theoretical understandings of the maintenance of PTSD 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000) as both models would suggest that blocking of trauma-based information 
should be related to greater distress.  More specifically, in terms of the SPAARS model, Phillips & 
Power (2007) outline that emotions provide functional information for overcoming difficulties and 
therefore blocking or suppression of this information prevents difficulties from being adaptively 
overcome.  Consequently, it was hypothesised that ‘dysfunctional’ strategies (those not making use 
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of emotional information) should be related to greater distress than functional ones (those which take 
emotional information into consideration).  Unfortunately, due to limited available data, it was not 
possible to explore this relationship further within this study and further research into this aspect of 
the SPAARS conceptualisation would be benefitial. 
 
19.1.7  Question 3:  Hypothesis c)  Distress should reduce over time (therefore be 
significantly higher in a sample flooded more recently). 
 
Previous studies noted that posttraumatic sequelae tend to remit over time (Neria et al., 2008; 
Rachman, 1980; 2001) and despite not utilising a longitudinal design, it was hypothesised that 
comparison of data from Carlisle and Morpeth flooded cohorts might reflect a reduction in scores in 
the Carlisle sample, related to remission over the time elapsed since the flood.  Indeed, Morpeth 
participants did not differ significantly in terms of the emotional experience they reported during or 
after the flood, compared to the pseudo-longitudinal Carlisle sample, suggesting relatively similar 
flood experiences.  However, Morpeth showed significantly higher intrusions, higher hyperarousal 
and significantly higher TSI mean scores compared to the Carlisle sample.  Although this supported 
both the study hypothesis and previous literature into remission of distress over time, this only 
applies if the samples were comparable at the time of flooding.   However, it is difficult to know the 
extent to which Carlisle and Morpeth samples were genuinely comparable in this regard.  Further 
longitudinal study of specific flooded samples would be beneficial in this regard. 
 
19.2 Question 4 – Qualitative Interviews 
 
SPAARS provides an alternative approach to understanding emotional experience and impact 
symptoms following a traumatic event (emotion-non-specific component), however a significant 
aspect of the framework pertains to the concept that emotions elicited can be related to specific 
appraisals made of the event in terms of life goals.  In addition, specific emotions are thought to be 
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related to certain profiles of symptoms; for example, disgust is related to appraisals of contamination 
and might be linked to symptoms such as washing behaviours (emotion-specific component).  There 
is less quantifiable evidence of this, but anecdotal reports provide support for the concept and 
therefore participants were approached in an attempt to qualitatively document evidence relating to 
this component.   
Unfortunately, participants contacted did not wish to be interviewed and it was therefore not possible 
to formally fulfil this aim of the study.  Disappointingly, this prevents any real discussion of the 
SPAARS hypothesis that appraisals might predict emotions and subsequent symptoms.  However, 
the lack of evidence to test does not invalidate further exploration of this issue and rather than 
disregarding the potential of the model, further research is recommended to compensate for the 
inability of this study to discuss this further. 
 
20.0 Limitations of study 
 
20.1 Sampling  
 
A significant weakness of the study relates to the limited data making it impossible to test many of 
the initial hypotheses and making it difficult to draw specific conclusions about the potential value of 
the SPAARS framework in understanding post-disaster distress.  This limitation is mainly associated 
with particular difficulties encountered in accessing flooded samples.  Despite over 1000 homes being 
affected in Carlisle, individuals were not responsive to being approached individually to be asked to 
participate.  Many stated that they did not wish to be involved without hearing what the study 
intended.  Poor responses led to an online survey being necessary which was also limited in its 
response rate despite participants being entered into a prize draw as an incentive.  In addition, a 
significant proportion of people flooded within Carlisle moved away from their homes following 
reinstatement and reflected a significant group, who may have been too distressed to remain within a 
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flood-risk zone, and who could be considered to have been more affected and more avoidant than 
those who remained within the flooded area.  It was not possible to access these individuals as 
agencies who held their contact details would not allow access to them and the local press would not 
publish advertisements which might encourage these individuals to participate.  Consequently, the 
Carlisle sample might be considered less representative of the broader flooded population who 
generally appear to not want to talk about the event.  In addition, the time interval between the 
Carlisle flood and involvement in the study meant that the relationship between current distress and 
flood variables appeared to be less pertinent.  Consequently, although the decision to focus on 
Morpeth data enabled a clearer comparison of effects of flood-variables, it is difficult to know how 
generalisable these findings are to other samples, or whether they are exclusively related to the event 
in Morpeth per se. 
 
Ethical difficulties were also encountered in approaching flood-affected people after the event.  
Initially, ethical approval was given to select addresses within flooded areas and approach these 
homes to seek volunteers for the study.  This was considered to be a rather intrusive approach, as 
participants would not have initiated contact themselves, however it is a method that is not without 
precedent in similar studies.  For example, within the flooded area in Carlisle, Carroll et al. (2009) 
gained access to the local council’s database of addresses and phone numbers of those affected and 
telephoned people to seek volunteers for their focus groups, which is considerably more intrusive, 
but appeared to be accepted by the local community.  Nevertheless, to overcome concerns about 
intrusiveness of sampling methods in this study, it was intended that articles in the local press might 
serve to forewarn potential participants that they would be approached.  However, when it was 
discovered that this was not possible in Carlisle, this sampling method was not undertaken further.  
Instead, leaflets were distributed to all households inviting them to participate remotely through a 
survey online to reduce the perceived intrusion of sampling.  In addition, the local flood action group 
in Morpeth was instead relied upon to mediate distribution of questionnaires to its members.  
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Consequently, sampling methods endeavoured to respect the privacy of potential volunteers at all 
times and when it appeared that this might be contravened, alternative and less intrusive methods 
were adopted. 
 
Compared to the Carlisle sample, Morpeth participants were more willing to participate and 
appeared to represent a less skewed and more cohesive community group who were willing to share 
their experiences and appreciated external interest in their difficulties.  This may potentially have 
been due to the flood-affected population in Carlisle having already been asked to participate in 
previous studies (e.g. Carroll et al, 2009) and therefore did not wish to be involved in another study.  
However, the Carroll et al (2009) study was based upon a smaller number of participants than 
responded to this study and might therefore reflect a more specific objection or reluctance to being 
involved in flood-related research within Carlisle.  In addition, as the majority of participants in 
Morpeth were members of the local Flood Action Group, their willingness to participate might be 
related to differences in the type of people who are inclined to join such action groups.  However the 
Action Group comprised all members of the local community who were affected by the flooding and 
may alternatively represent differences between small rural communities compared to larger urban 
populations affected by such events.  Despite this, a number of individuals described feeling too 
distressed to participate in the study; consequently although findings demonstrate significant 
difficulties within members of the community, they might in fact underestimate the degree of 
difficulties experienced.  In both samples it is also likely that individuals who participated differed 
fundamentally from those who did not want to be involved and therefore reflect self-selected 
samples.  The extent to which findings can be generalised to other flooded populations is therefore 
questionable.  Nevertheless, a sample that reported greater distress enabled greater opportunity to 
access emotions and study their impact upon trauma symptoms and was potentially more useful for 






Carlisle and Morpeth participants appeared to respond as expected to emotions before and after the 
flood and suggested that there were some differences in their emotional experiences between the two 
time points.  However, it was unclear whether participants accurately differentiated between the two 
Basic Emotions Subscales used, particularly as many participants completed surveys remotely and 
without having this clarified for them by the researcher.   The Basic Emotions Scale (Power, 2006) is 
also not a widely validated measure; however its design was the most appropriate for use in testing 
the hypotheses of this study and was therefore considered to have fulfilled this role better than other 
measures may have done.  There were also difficulties in establishing the accuracy of disgust ratings 
on this measure as it was consistently rated lower than the other emotions.  However, previous 
literature encountered the same difficulty in obtaining ratings of this emotion (Phillips & Power, 2007) 
and therefore the Basic Emotions Scale potentially fulfilled this purpose as well as other measures 
might.   
 
The Regulation of Emotions Questionnaire (Phillips & Power, 2007) is also a relatively new measure 
and has less literature supporting its validity to date.  Nevertheless, it too appeared to be appropriate 
for use within this sample, providing an accurate measure of regulation strategies which would 
appear to have captured regulation tendencies in a meaningful and acceptable format for participants 
involved.   
 
In addition, demographic data gathered from participants was extremely useful in ascertaining flood-
related differences which might have a bearing on emotional impact or distress.  Participants were 
asked to state whether they had experienced any traumatic events prior to flooding and a variety of 
responses were provided.  In terms of previous traumas, the literature states that experience of 
Criterion A events increases the risk of posttraumatic difficulties following subsequent traumatic 
events.  However, participants were often uncertain as to what constituted a previous ‘trauma’ and 
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either listed distressing life events which would not fulfil the criterion or may have not reported 
events which would fulfil it.  Although there are Life Events Checklists available which would serve 
to clarify these distinctions for participants, the Edinburgh Traumatic Stress Centre advised against 
using such a measure in a non-clinical population.   
 
Finally, the Trauma Symptom Inventory (TSI) and Impact of Events Scale (IES-R) are well established 
and widely validated measures of trauma sequelae.  However, participants did not like the items on 
the Trauma Symptom Inventory, particularly relating to sexual subscales.   These subscales are not 
particularly relevant in establishing traumatic experiences within environmental disaster samples, as 
they were designed to assess traumatic sequelae in those affected by sexual traumas.  Nevertheless, 
despite having no relevance to the current trauma focus, some participants refused to complete the 
survey based upon the distress they felt at these items.  In addition, some participants who did 
complete the survey reported discomfort at completing some of the TSI items.  As a consequence, 
participants potentially gave more socially desirable responses on this scale than they might have 
with other trauma measures.  In addition, more participants may have been recruited if an alternative 




The most significant design limitation of this study was the inability to fulfil the final aim of the 
study, into the influence of appraisals in predicting emotions and specific symptoms based on 
qualitative interviews with selected individuals.  At the time of the survey, all participants were 
asked to provide consent to be contacted to be interviewed about their experience.  Very few 
participants opted out of this aspect of the study and only those who had provided consent were 
contacted later by email (the preferred method given by all volunteers).  Individuals were thanked for 
participating in the first part of the survey and were assured that they had the right to withdraw 
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consent to be interviewed.  They were asked to contact the researcher to arrange a convenient time for 
an interview but that if they did not respond to the invitation within four weeks, it would be assumed 
that they did not wish to participate.  As these participants were selected due to higher scores for 
distress, they were not asked more than once whether they wished to participate.  As such, every 
endeavour was made to be as accommodating and flexible in engaging with a more distressed 
portion of the sample, while respecting their right to opt out.  However, only two of the participants 
made contact to arrange an interview, and only one of them attended.  At this time, the participant 
only wished to be interviewed informally, thereby preventing detailed analysis of qualitative data.  
Unfortunately, being unable to fulfil this aim detracts greatly from the ability of the study to discuss 
the utility of the SPAARS model more thoroughly.  However, the fact that SPAARS-based 
quantitative hypotheses are supported despite being contraindicated by previous literature goes some 
way to at least presenting this novel framework as something worth considering further. 
The lack of a control sample was also a particular weakness of the study, but the control sample 
sought within Carlisle did not respond to invitations to participate.  However, even with greater 
numbers, this population may not have reflected a true control group, as those actively moving into 
an area which has been recently flooded may differ fundamentally from those who would not for fear 
of it occurring again.  This group may therefore have provided a skewed sample for comparison and 
participants gathered from the general population may have been more representative.  However, as 
stated by Stout & Knight (1990), ‘because natural disasters such as floods strike unexpectedly, finding 
comparable control groups for victims is a major obstacle for disaster research’ (p.129). 
 
In addition, although differences in trauma symptoms between Carlisle and Morpeth cohorts 
appeared to be related to time elapsed since the flood, there were differences between the flood 
events in each area which would influence reactions of those involved.  For example, the flooding in 
Morpeth occurred faster and with greater force from the local river bursting its banks compared to 
110 
 
Carlisle where the majority of flooding occurred due to slow backup of pluvial water.  In Carlisle, the 
flooding was considerably more extensive and affected the city’s utilities such as water supplies and 
power, as well as affecting local emergency services compared to specific sites being flooded within 
Morpeth.  Finally, the extent of the flooding in Carlisle could account for some differences in 
appraisals, as those affected were more forgiving of mistakes made by authorities due to their 
understanding that the entire city was affected by the disaster; whereas in Morpeth, victims felt let 
down and perceived negligence or deliberate actions by authorities when mistakes were made.  In 
addition, there are many interrelated variables involved in flood events and an inability to control for 
them presents significant problems in research of this type.  Flooded samples therefore present a 
heterogeneous mix of variables pertaining to an individual’s emotional and psychological history, 
coping styles, interpersonal styles and how all of these interact with specific flood variables and 
appraisals, making it difficult to attribute distress according to causal factors. 
 
Samples such as these are also subject to the possibility of recall biases.  As Caldera et al. (2001) noted 
individuals suffering from mental distress after disasters may be more likely to report negative events 
and outcomes, such as greater destruction of property, therefore affecting generalisability of findings.  
In addition, it could be argued that there are flaws in a design that expects people to recall events 
which occurred up to four years earlier.  Nevertheless, participants in Carlisle generated scores 
pertaining to the event which were equivalent to those in Morpeth who were flooded more recently, 
potentially supporting previous findings that recollections of an event as salient as a flood are broadly 
consistent over time (Tapsell et al., 2003).   
 
A potential weakness is also related to the fact that the researcher had been affected personally by the 
flooding in Carlisle and could be subject to greater bias than researchers who had not experienced 
this.  However, the design of the study investigated questions in which bias would be less of an issue.  
Importantly, the personal flood experience of the researcher was valuable in establishing the research 
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questions and design undertaken in this study.  Furthermore, participants in Morpeth reported 
greater interest in the study as a consequence of the researcher having been affected and therefore 
agreed to participate as they felt more ‘understood’ than if research were conducted by someone with 
no experience of flooding.   
 
 
21.0  Implications for future research and clinical practice 
 
21.1 Future Research 
 
In their original paper, Dalgleish & Power (2004) presented examples of SPAARS formulations 
derived from case studies within the previous literature and from clinical practice, which was an 
intended endeavour of this flood study.   As it was not possible to fulfil this objective, further studies 
of similar focus would be of clinical benefit, particularly as those affected anecdotally describe their 
experiences within a SPAARS framework without any prompting from a potentially biased 
researcher.  In addition, replication of this study might benefit from using additional quantitative 
tools to record concepts such as appraisals, automatic emotions, emotions derived from appraisals 
(existential emotions) and symptoms driven by specific emotions as this could greatly increase our 
understanding of the framework and its applicability in samples such as these. 
 
As Carlisle and Morpeth experienced differences in the characteristics of their flood events, it would 
be interesting to follow-up current Morpeth participants and use current Morpeth data as a baseline 
for measuring changes in their trauma symptoms over time.  Also, being able to access groups who 
were not included within this study (such as those who moved away from the area) would be 
valuable in understanding the serious long-term difficulties experienced by proportions of the 
population who are potentially more affected by the event than those who remain in the area.  In 
addition, it would have been interesting to have enquired into the use of mental health services and 
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prevalence of psychotropic prescriptions within study samples to ascertain the clinical service impact 
of flood events within local areas. 
 
It would also be of interest to focus further on investigating the presence of ‚traumatic growth‛ and 
resilience in flooded populations.  Although this study and its predecessors have been useful in 
showing the negative effects and traumatic potential of flooding, individuals within flooded samples 
also report positive impacts of their experience; for example, in helping them recognise different 
priorities in their lives and establishing new friendships (Hobfoll et al., 2006; O’Leary et al., 1998; 
Shakespeare-Finch et al., 2003).  These aspects are rarely investigated in psychological research where 
a tendency towards seeking out psychopathology within distressed populations remains the most 
common focus.  Indeed, Government policies are beginning to notice findings such as those within 
this study which show that people experience greater distress when they are displaced from home 
and are consequently encouraging people to remain there where possible.  However giving such 
advice based upon the face value of such research findings could potentially be more damaging for 
individuals.   It is not always possible for people to return home, therefore understanding these 
findings in greater detail and understanding how to reduce distress in displaced families will enable 
provision of more appropriate and clinically valid assistance to populations experiencing flood 
events.   
 
It is also apparent that flooding affects populations in a potentially complex manner and may have 
greater emotional underlay than other traumas, as the potential for complex appraisals during a flood 
is greater than it might be with more straightforward traumatic events.   Consequently, more research 
into trauma-related appraisals and emotional experiences of flooded samples would be of scientific 
and clinical relevance.  In doing so, ensuring quantitative measures are more socially acceptable may 
help in recruiting greater numbers of participants and gaining more accurate results.  Also, previous 
Health Surveys conducted by the National Flood Forum in flooded communities across the United 
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Kingdom in recent years have received impressively high response rates.  Further studies should seek 
to involve these agencies in future research and data collection as flooded populations perceive them 
as more approachable than other statutory or research agencies.  In addition, it was described by 
many participants that once they returned home, they wanted to try to forget what had happened 
and therefore did not wish to participate further.  Although understandable, this highlights the 
question of whether distress in individuals whose homes have been reinstated do in fact remit 
entirely and that only those with ongoing distress are more likely to volunteer for long-term studies, 
or whether people become increasingly avoidant of distress.  As a researcher with personal 
experience of the longer term impact of flooding, and contact with individuals for whom 
reinstatement and flood-related difficulties continue many years after flooding, (for example, when 
poor workmanship means houses have to undergo further reconstruction to remove all flood-
reinstated work and replace it a second time, but in the face of increased difficulties with insurance 
companies not accepting responsibility), the longer term impacts described in the literature, based 
upon individuals who do volunteer for studies does not always portray experiences as observed 
within the population as a whole.  It is therefore suggested that future research endeavours more to 
define the complexities of these experiences, including positive and normative distress reactions in 
order to better classify the variety of difficulties that those affected might experience. 
 
Furthermore, consideration of a SPAARS-type framework may not be pertinent merely to experiences 
such as flooding.  Further research into this model within samples of complex traumas or distressing 
experiences, such as cancer patients or those enduring disfiguring surgery, or within victims of 
criminal activity, might foster better understandings of the variety of traumatic experiences and life 





21.2 Implications  
 
This study has endeavoured to focus on flood-related experiences in a manner which is unparalleled 
in much of the trauma literature and therefore poses a number of implications. 
 
Firstly, previous literature focuses on pathologised reactions which detract from our understanding 
of normative distress following such events.  This is further reflected in the current paucity of 
literature on resilience following disasters.  In fact, sharing and helping among victims is often 
described as a positive experience that occurs as a result of disasters (Adams & Adams, 1984) but this 
is often forgotten in pathologically-focussed research.   
 
Related to this, the bulk of previous literature falls into one of two opposing categories; either 
pathologising all levels of the distress experienced while failing to demonstrate thorough 
understandings of the classifications it uses, or normalising all distress to the point of minimising the 
potential clinical severity of some reactions, often based upon subjective assumptions of whether 
events are ‘traumatic enough’.  As such, it is extremely interesting within this study that clinically 
significant distress was found to a similar degree to that within the pathologically-focussed literature, 
despite hypothesising to the contrary.  Nevertheless, finding clinically significant distress within a 
relatively large proportion of the sample still does not define it as pathological.  Indeed the nature of 
this distress and its readiness to spontaneous remission is still not well understood and judgements 
upon clinical meaning should be avoided without further information.  Therefore, flood distress 
should neither be entirely pathologised, nor entirely normalised, but should be considered as possible 
and considered on individual merit based upon complex individual experiences.  
 
Findings of clinically-significant distress within this study also present implications for the service 
planning and provision around future flood events and concerns about the perception of post-
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disaster distress which have been discussed herein are pertinent to the service-planning issue.  
Previous literature suggests that there is ‘compelling evidence that health services need to anticipate 
and prepare for epidemics of PTSD and a lesser extent MDD (major depressive disorder), especially 
when associated with mass casualties and higher degree of community destruction’ (Norris et al., 
2004; p.290).  This might be a valuable preparatory assertion for services that endeavour to have 
resources available for intervening in acute distress; however, it reflects the literature’s expectation 
that PTSD is an inevitable and common occurrence.  Although risks and severe symptoms should 
always be considered as a matter of urgency, pathologising the occurrence of distress after disastrous 
life events can be detrimental to populations who are generally psychologically-intact.  Anecdotally, 
these are often populations with limited prior experience of mental health services and for whom 
psychological difficulties might still pose a significant social stigma.  Consequently, highlighting to 
such populations that distress following events is understandable and even expected can reduce fear 
and maintains psychological integrity.    Indeed, a number of participants within these samples who 
would have individually met Criteria A for PTSD in terms of their flood experience described normal 
levels of distress which remitted naturally, and therefore, although clinically significant distress 
occurred with greater frequency than anticipated, it is important that studies reflect more carefully on 
the distress they describe.  Distress can be clinically significant without being pathological and can 
still be conceptualised as a normative reaction to abnormal events.  As such, providing messages 
which foster a degree of normalisation of post-disaster distress not only encourages better coping but 
also reduces perceived stigmatisation.  Nevertheless, it is essential that distress is not minimised, as 
this too is detrimental to the psychological wellbeing of those affected.   
Furthermore, use of professional support within these samples is not well understood and it is 
difficult to know the true service impact of events such as flooding.  In Carlisle and Morpeth, local 
mental health services were prepared to act quickly upon referral of flood-affected individuals; 
however, the levels of uptake of services is not known, and anecdotally many people affected report 
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that they did not approach services for support.   Importantly, previous studies into farmers affected 
by Foot & Mouth disease have suggested that despite significant distress, few of those affected 
approached mental health services or accepted input offered to them, preferring instead to utilise 
their own mechanisms of emotional support at these times (Peck, 2005).  Consequently, statutory 
agencies often don’t experience the opportunity to learn about their shortcomings in providing 
services to this population.  It is, however, possible that mental health services might not have a role 
to play in populations who appear unwilling to approach them for assistance, but it is difficult to 
know whether services are just not needed or are feared within these disaster-affected populations, 
prohibiting affected individuals from seeking consultation.  As such, services should not overlook the 
importance of being available and focussing support in a format that is acceptable to the local 
community and complementary to their current methods of service use.  
 
Of interest when conducting this study were observations that knowledge of flood-related distress 
was varied across the range of organisations who engaged with those affected by flooding, especially 
when this knowledge is so pertinent to support that is provided.  In meeting informally with 
participants and community groups, comparatively few people had approached statutory services to 
disclose the kind of difficulties or distress found within this study sample.  Affected individuals often 
gravitated to voluntary organisations and local community groups who provided a valuable 
supportive service for flooded communities.  However, they generally possessed little expertise in 
managing flood-related distress other than based upon their personal experiences.  Despite the 
inherent value of this support, untrained volunteers with personal experience of flooding have the 
potential to misunderstand individual differences in responses to the same event, possibly expecting 
everyone to respond as they did, which could be detrimental to those accessing support.  Of those 
who did approach their GPs about difficulties such as poor sleep or appetite, many were given 
courses of antidepressants with no particular flood-related focus to their treatment.  Comparatively 
few went on to make use of specialist mental health services and those who did found similarly 
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polarised professional perceptions about the impact of flood-related trauma: either perceiving it as 
‘less serious’ and underestimating the potential for flooding to generate posttraumatic distress; or 
pathologising comparatively ‘normal’ responses to flood trauma.  Consequently, findings of this 
study might have some relevance in helping mental health specialists and primary care to understand 
that flooding can be a genuinely traumatic event with the potential to be more complex in terms of 
experiencing loss, anger, fear and disgust than is currently perceived.  In addition, clinical opinions 
which minimise the potential for flooding to fulfil Criteria A of the DSM-IV classification of PTSD 
should be careful not to make assumptions based upon the objective safety of hindsight; indeed the 
actual threat to life and physical integrity posed by the event may have been more real or more 
genuinely perceived than most clinicians realise.  Furthermore, although flooding can appear as a 
‘less dangerous event’, it is one in which people can spend considerable periods of time without the 
security of their homes and in conflict with agencies over ownership of their property.  As such, 
displacement and distress of flooded families might be more appropriately understood in comparison 
with some refugee communities, who would be recognised immediately as more ‘traumatised’ and 
given appropriate consideration than those affected by flooding. 
 
In undertaking this study it was clear that having been personally affected by flooding gave the 
researcher greater access to the affected population and was therefore subsequently approached by 
the Morpeth community to provide advice and assistance about what to expect in the flood aftermath 
as someone who had already experienced this.  Sadly, local professionals could have been better 
placed to provide this; but the community was more amenable to asking for assistance from those 
with personal experience of being flooded, albeit that they were from other localities.  Therefore, 
flooded samples, despite being easily identified are not easily accessed, and statutory agencies would 
be advised to find different methods of providing assistance to this population; for example, by 
providing teaching or advice to local groups rather than expecting to see individuals for one-to-one 
interventions.  Government agencies would also be advised to consider how to access these affected 
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populations in a manner which they feel comfortable with, as they did not respond amenably to 
advice from agencies that had no personal experience of these difficulties.   
 
Finally, wider implications pertain to the potential relevance of the SPAARS model (Dalgleish & 
Power, 2004) in formulating distress of this sort.  As outlined, flood trauma is a complex experience 
often ‘judged’ in terms of subjective clinical attributions and previous literature focuses on 
differentiating distress based upon objective flood variables but without consideration of individual 
experience or meaning.  Previous literature also either pathologises or minimises flood-related 
distress and where posttraumatic stress symptoms are noted, they are understood solely in terms of 
fear experienced during the event, without accounting for the complexity or variety of reactions 
observed in flooded populations.  The tenet of this study was therefore to move away from these 
current assumptions of disaster experience and encourage exploration of the complexities of 
reactions; but if clinicians aim to do this in their work, how can they know they are formulating 
disaster distress in a clinically valuable and individually meaningful way?   
Although not entirely addressed within the findings of this study, there is some evidence that 
SPAARS model might hold particular value in answering this concern.  Firstly, in terms of the wider 
traumatic literature, the consideration of discrepancies as being predictive of posttraumatic sequelae 
is extremely valuable in recognising that we cannot always predict who might suffer most in the 
aftermath of trauma, and that individuals with previous trauma experiences might not always be 
those who are at the greatest risk of posttraumatic distress.  Secondly, recognising that differential 
emotions can predict posttraumatic sequelae in both Criteria A and non-Criteria A events is a novel 
perspective, and has significant implications for understanding and for effectively treating the variety 
of posttraumatic reactions noted.  For example, PTSD is currently treated with interventions designed 
for the remission of anxiety, but if anxiety is not the predominant underlying emotion then current 
interventions may at best be ineffective and at worst increase individuals’ distress further.  
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Consequently, consideration should be given to alternative underlying emotions when formulating 
individuals’ difficulties and alternative treatments for distress based on remission of anger, sadness 
or disgust should be considered further as need arises.  Indeed such a perspective has already been 
applied within the specialist tertiary trauma service provided at the Edinburgh Traumatic Stress 
Centre, based upon the strength of the theory presented, even in the absence of supportive literature. 
Thirdly, the Dalgleish & Power (2004) model is elegant in structuring posttraumatic experiences 
within a framework based upon normative emotion and cognitive function; reminding us that 
distress symptoms can occur on a spectrum of severity, rather than solely pathologising the 
symptoms that individuals might experience.  With this in mind, although the majority of distress 
will improve over time, providing education for affected groups about what is ‘normal’ to expect 
following traumatic difficulties could prevent individuals from being concerned about ‘unusual’ 
symptoms and from engaging in avoidant strategies which could ultimately cause them greater and 




Findings that SPAARS-based hypotheses were supported to some degree by quantitative data are 
considered with great interest.  Although the hypotheses and subsequent findings are sometimes 
contradictory to previous literature and may therefore be contentious or challenging in their nature, it 
is easy to condemn or invalidate them as flawed and misguided without considering the wider value 
they present.  These findings are not presented to condemn previous literature nor claim conceptual 
supremacy but merely to offer a challenge to the conclusions drawn by previous literature.  The fact 
that hypotheses have been fulfilled which are contradictory to previous understandings reflect that 
greater consideration of individually-derived meanings should be practised; not only individual 
meanings attributed to events such as flooding, but also to the meanings construed within the trauma 
literature of the findings they present.   A degree of meaning is always lost in the quantification of 
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any construct and as further qualitative data were not available, SPAARS conclusions within this 
study are discussed with caution.  However, the value of the model does not lie in quantitative 
support for its constructs, but in the fact that the model considers individual appraisals and 
experience above all else.  It also considers the potentially normal nature of distress and thereby 
provides a unique model by which to formulate post-disaster distress.  Indeed, its adoption within 
the Edinburgh Traumatic Stress Centre as a valid clinical formulation highlights its utility for those 
experiencing intense distress following a variety of events.   
At the very least, SPAARS provided a clinician who had personal experience of flooding with a 
realistic clinical framework to conceptualise the variety of post-flood reactions when other 
frameworks either did not appear to offer the same degree of sophistication, or resorted to 
pathologising or minimising posttraumatic formulations.  It is therefore recommended that further 
consideration within clinical practice should be given to the constructs of this model and meanings of 
events to those affected; and that clinical assumptions should be applied with caution to avoid 
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University Ethics Approval  
 
DClinPsychol Ethics Meeting (Panel 2) 
 10th November 2008 
Present       Apologies 
Emily Newman (Chair)     Dave Peck 
David Gillanders      Lindsey Murray      (comments submitted)  
Ethel Quayle                                                                                         Karen McKenzie     (comments submitted) 
 
Trainee CEJN 
The panel were positve about the proposal and felt that there was a good theoretical basis to it and that it had 
ecological validity. There was, however, a need for further clarification in some areas.  
Ethical: 
 A picture of a flood scene has been placed on the information sheet. Concern was expressed that this 
may evoke memories that would be distressing to some participants. 
 There is confusion about anonymity and confidentiality which needs clarification. It is likely that she 
can ensure the former but not the latter. 
 The word chat is used in the information sheet which does not accurately reflect what might be an 
interview of the participant. This is too informal and needs changing. 
 Similarly the use of the words ‘drop-out’ may have an overly negative tone and should be replaced by, 
‘any participants who wish to withdraw from the study’.  
 The wording ‘training to be a trainer’ needs to be changed as does the name of the academic 
programme, which is incorrect. 
 Giving folk "information about where to seek local help for more persistent difficulties" is mentioned 
but this may create ethical problems.  For example, what about those who have been traumatised but 
never referred to services? 
 Will the proposal be also submitted to the NHS Ethics Committee? 
 
Methodological: 
 It is unclear what the hypotheses of the study are beyond the general description of the aims. 
 There is no clear operational definition of what will be included as flooding. This potentially covers a 
wide range of experiences and may be associated with an array of emotional reactions.  
 Is it likely that emotional reactions to flooding are likely to be mediated by the causal attributions that 
people make? Will these differ depending on the nature of the flood/level of damage? 
 An assumption is made that flooding is associated with PTSD, but it is not clear what the evidence 
base is for this. Would the study have greater clarity if it attempted to establish if this is the case as a 
primary goal of the study, which then might include an examination of the emotional reactions to 
flooding? 
 Are there any possible problems with respondents in the cohort from 2005 being able to recall their 
emotional reactions at the time of the flood? Is this going to make comparisons with the 2008 cohort 
problematic? 
 Are the new residents going to be asked to participate as a control? This is unclear. Would it make 
more sense for those who lived in the area but were not flooded to act as a control? 
 The geographical areas listed at the beginning of the proposal are not the same as those from which 
the sample will be drawn. This needs to be amended. 
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 Is the power analysis based on previous studies? This needs further clarification. 
 There is confusion over which emotional reactions are being measured. On the information sheet 
reference is made to ‘just before the flood’ whereas in the proposal it is described as ‘during the 
flood’. This needs to be amended. 
 The information sheet provides a list of post traumatic symptoms. Is there a possibility that this will 
affect respondents’ participation and recall?  
 







Re: Changes following ethics  
Mick Power [mjpower@staffmail.ed.ac.uk]  
Sent:   10 December 2008 15:11  





In response to your email, the proposed changes look fine and you do not need to re-submit them to 
the Clinical Psychology Ethics Committee or any other Ethics Committee. 
 
I hope these comments cover what you have asked, but get back to me with any further questions. 
And, if you don’t have any, then why not get started! 
 









NHS Research & Development Consent  
 
RE: Were you Flooded  
Haining Shona \(5D8\) North Tyneside PCT [Shona.Haining@northtyneside-pct.nhs.uk]  
Sent:   05 February 2009 08:26  
To:  Trainee CEJN (NHS Dumfries and Galloway) 
Thanks for your explanation – your study does not require NHS approval as I see that it is not involving 
participant from a service-related sample.  Nevertheless, I always advise researchers to contact R&D depts to 
get their views and assurance it does not need approvals if that is the case.   We will let this continue as I know 
you will be following ethical procedures and wish you luck with the study.  
 
Best regards, Shona 
 
Shona A Haining BSc PhD 
Research & Development Manager 
NHS North of Tyne 
  
Bevan House, 1 Esh Plaza, Sir Bobby Robson Way, Great Park 
NEWCASTLE 
NE13 9BA 




RE: Were you Flooded  
Moores Alex:  North Cumbria Mental Health and LD Trust [Alex.Moores@ncumbria.nhs.uk]  
Sent:   10 February 2009 14:36  
To:  Trainee CEJN (NHS Dumfries and Galloway)  
Thank you for your email about your study.  However as it does not involve a clinical sample, it does not 
require us to give approval for it.  Thank you for the courtesy of contacting us.  Please do not hesitate to 
contact us again if we can be of assistance.   
Yours sincerely 
Alex Moores 
Research & Development North Cumbria NHS  
Carleton Clinic, Cumwhinton Drive, CARLISLE 




















































Post traumatic reactions and 
emotions experienced by 
victims of flooding 
 






Participants are being recruited to take part in a study about the emotional and psychological 
reactions of people who have experienced flooding.  The research is being conducted as part of a 
study from the University of Edinburgh.  As part of the study, we wish to hear from people who 
were affected directly by flooding, but also by those living within the area who were not flooded.  
Before you decide if you wish to take part, it is important that you understand why the research is 






























2. What is the purpose of the research? 
Flooding is becoming increasingly common and it would be helpful for professional agencies to 
understand what people experience when they are affected by flooding so that we can help people 
who are affected as well as people who might be flooded in future. 
Also, people can experience different types of traumas and this study will help us to understand 
better how people feel after they have experienced distressing events so that we can offer more 
appropriate help to them. 
 
3. What will I have to do to take part? 
If you agree to take part, you will be asked to complete some questionnaires.  These 
questionnaires will ask you to tell us about your feelings during the flood and once the water had 
gone.   Then they will ask you about specific symptoms which psychologists understand can 
happen after people have experienced traumatic things and about the ways in which you usually 
cope with difficulties that occur generally.   
When we ask you to complete these questionnaires, we will ask you if you would feel happy to let 
us have your name and contact details.  You do not have to give this information if you don’t want 
to.  If you do, we might contact you at a later date to ask you some more questions about your 
experience during the flood.   
If you give us your information and then we contact you but you have changed your mind and 
don’t want to be interviewed, you can drop out at that point too. 
 
 
4. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You would be helping us to get a better understanding of how flooding affects people and how it 
makes them feel.  You would also be helping us to understand how people who experience other 
traumatic events might feel which might help us to help them. 
We hope the results will be used to provide services with a better understanding about how to help 






























5. What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? 
We understand that having been affected by flooding you might not want to talk about it, or might 
get upset when you start thinking about it.  We will be as considerate of this as possible and you do 
not have to take part in the study if you are concerned about this.   
If you do wish to take part but become upset, you might want to withdraw from the study and you 
can do this at any time.   However, if you feel particularly distressed as a result of your experience 
during the flood, we would recommend that you speak to your GP for advice. 
6. Who will be able to see my answers? 
Only the researchers will see the questionnaires you filled in and we won’t talk to other people 
about what you have answered.  If you are worried about this, you can answer the questionnaires 
anonymously if you prefer. 
A small number of individuals might be approached if they have provided their contact details but 
once we have selected these people and spoken to them, all details will be disposed of securely. 
What will happen to all the results of the research study? 
The results will be included in a Doctoral thesis by the researcher.  The summary results will also be 
presented to be published and will be presented at conferences so that other professionals and 
services can learn from the findings.   
However the results will be anonymous and no one will be able to identify who took part in the 
study.  The researcher will also be happy to provide a summary of what the research findings were 
but will not be able to give individuals feedback of their results once the study is complete. 
Further information: 
The researcher is a Trainee Clinical Psychologist with the University of Edinburgh Clinical 
Psychology Doctorate course and was herself flooded in Carlisle in 2005, leading to a professional 
interest in this as a result of her experience. 
The research has been reviewed by the Ethics Committee at the University of Edinburgh and will 
































Please feel free to contact the researcher, Catherine Nesbitt: 
On: 07739 438427 
Or: 01387 244495  
Or by email:   catherine.nesbitt@nhs.net 
 
Also, please feel free to speak to your local area representative at the National Flood Forum: 
(See www.floodforum.org.uk for details) or call 01299 403101. 
Participant Consent Form: 
 
Please sign if you agree with the following points:   
I have read and understood the information about the study and could ask questions that I 
needed to. 


































Do you live within the area that was flooded in 2005? 
 
Were you flooded yourself or have you moved into 
the area since? 
 
We need your help 
 
 
A researcher from the University of Edinburgh is conducting a study locally into the 
effects of being flooded and of living in an area which was affected by the flooding in 
2005.  Whether you lived here at the time or have moved here since, we are looking 
for volunteers to help us with this project. 
 
The project has been approved by the University of Edinburgh and addresses within 
the flooded area are being chosen at random.  The occupiers of these addresses are 
being approached to give additional information about the study and to ask if they 
might take a few minutes to complete some questionnaires.  
 
Your address has been selected randomly and the researcher will be returning to 
ask if you would volunteer to complete approximately six questionnaires.  They 
may take about 20 minutes to complete.  You can complete them anonymously if 
you prefer and either return them by post or we can go through them with you in 
person if you wish. 
 
If you do not wish to be approached by the researcher, please contact them 
(details below) to ask that your address be removed from the selected list. 
 
As a token of appreciation for taking part, all volunteers will be entered into a draw 
to win a £50 token from a shop of their choice.   
 
If you are not sure whether you want to take part but would like further information, 
please contact the researcher who would be happy to answer any questions you 
have about the study.  We would really appreciate your help and look forward to 
hearing from you. 
 
Please contact the researcher, Catherine Nesbitt (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) 
On:    01387 244495 
Or by emailing:  catherine.nesbitt@nhs.net 
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The Basic Emotions Scale – Part 1 
Short-Version 
 
When confronted with a traumatic experience, people react emotionally to the event.  Sometimes some of 
these emotions prevail over others and linger.  This scale is designed to explore how your traumatic experience 
affected how you have felt. 
 
Think back to your experience during the flood, and how you felt while water was in your house.  With this 
in mind, look at each emotion and please circle one number between 1 and 7 to indicate how often you’ve felt 
that emotion since your traumatic experience. 
 
DURING the flood, I felt this emotion: 
    Never                                                     Sometimes                                            Very often 
Anger 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Despair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Shame 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Anxiety 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Happiness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Frustration 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Misery 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Guilt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Nervousness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Joy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Irritation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Gloominess 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Humiliated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Tense 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Loving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Aggression 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mournful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Blameworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Worried 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cheerful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




Thank you – please complete the next questionnaire. 
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The Basic Emotions Scale – Part 2 
Short-Version 
 
When confronted with a traumatic experience, people react emotionally to the event.  Sometimes some of 
these emotions prevail over others and linger.  This scale is designed to explore how your traumatic experience 
affected how you have felt. 
 
Think about how you felt after the flood, during the clearing up and reinstatement process.  With this in 
mind, look at each emotion and please circle one number between 1 and 7 to indicate how often you’ve felt 
that emotion since your traumatic experience. 
 
AFTER the flood, I felt this emotion: 
    Never                                                     Sometimes                                            Very often 
Anger 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Despair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Shame 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Anxiety 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Happiness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Frustration 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Misery 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Guilt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Nervousness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Joy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Irritation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Gloominess 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Humiliated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Tense 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Loving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Aggression 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mournful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Blameworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Worried 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cheerful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disgust (i.e. repulsion) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 










IMPACT OF EVENT SCALE-REVISED 
 
Instructions:      The following is a list of difficulties people sometimes have after stressful life events.  Please read each 
item, and then indicate how distressing each difficulty has been for you during the past 7 days with respect to the flood.   
How much were you distressed or bothered by these difficulties? 















1 Any reminder brought back feelings about it. 0 1 2 3 4 
2 I had trouble staying asleep. 0 1 2 3 4 
3 Other things kept making me think about it. 0 1 2 3 4 
4 I felt irritable and angry. 0 1 2 3 4 
5 I avoided letting myself get upset when I thought about it or was 
reminded of it. 
0 1 2 3 4 
6 I thought about it when I didn’t mean to. 0 1 2 3 4 
7 I felt as if it hadn’t happened or wasn’t real. 0 1 2 3 4 
8 I stayed away from reminders about it. 0 1 2 3 4 
9 Pictures about it popped into my mind. 0 1 2 3 4 
10 I was jumpy and easily startled. 0 1 2 3 4 
11 I tried not to think about it. 0 1 2 3 4 
12 I was aware that I still had a lot of feelings about it, but I didn’t deal 
with them. 
0 1 2 3 4 
13 My feelings about it were kind of numb. 0 1 2 3 4 
14 I found myself acting or feeling like I was back at that time. 0 1 2 3 4 
15 I had trouble falling asleep. 0 1 2 3 4 
16 I had waves of strong feelings about it. 0 1 2 3 4 
17 I tried to remove it from my memory. 0 1 2 3 4 
18 I had trouble concentrating. 0 1 2 3 4 
19 Reminders of it caused me to have physical reactions, such as 
sweating, trouble breathing, nausea, or a pounding heart. 
0 1 2 3 4 
20 I had dreams about it. 0 1 2 3 4 
21 I felt watchful and on guard. 0 1 2 3 4 









Trauma Symptom Inventory, TSI  




Trauma Symptom Inventory 
Adapted Format 
 
This questionnaire contains 100 items describing experiences that may or may not have happened to you.   Please do not 
feel alarmed by the content of any of the items; they are all symptoms that have been reported by people who have 
experienced traumatic events.   
 
For each item, please circle the one answer that best indicates how often each of the following experiences have 
happened to you in the last 6 months. 
 
Please answer each item as honestly as you can.  Be sure to answer every item.  You can take as much time as you need to 
finish it. 
 
In the last 6 months, how often have you experienced: 
 Never  Often 
1.   Nightmares or bad dreams 0 1 2 3 
2.  Trying to forget about a bad time in your life 0 1 2 3 
3.  Irritability 0 1 2 3 
4.  Stopping yourself from thinking about the past 0 1 2 3 
5.  Getting angry about something that wasn’t very important 0 1 2 3 
6.  Feeling empty inside 0 1 2 3 
7.  Sadness 0 1 2 3 
8.  Flashbacks (sudden memories or images of upsetting things) 0 1 2 3 
9.  Not being satisfied with your sex life 0 1 2 3 
10.  Feeling like you were outside of your body 0 1 2 3 
11.  Lower back pain 0 1 2 3 
12.  Sudden disturbing memories when you were not expecting them 0 1 2 3 
13.  Wanting to cry 0 1 2 3 
14.  Not feeling happy 0 1 2 3 
15.  Becoming angry for little or no reason 0 1 2 3 
16.  Feeling like you don’t know who you really are 0 1 2 3 
17.  Feeling depressed 0 1 2 3 
18.  Having sex with someone you hardly knew 0 1 2 3 
19.  Thoughts or fantasies about hurting someone 0 1 2 3 
20.  Your mind going blank 0 1 2 3 
21.  Fainting 0 1 2 3 
22.  Periods of trembling or shaking 0 1 2 3 
23.  Pushing painful memories out of your mind 0 1 2 3 
24.  Not understanding why you did something 0 1 2 3 
25.  Threatening or attempting suicide 0 1 2 3 
26.  Feeling like you were watching yourself from far away 0 1 2 3 
27.  Feeling tense or “on edge” 0 1 2 3 
28.  Getting into trouble because of sex 0 1 2 3 
29.  Not feeling like your real self 0 1 2 3 
30.  Wishing you were dead 0 1 2 3 
31.  Worrying about things 0 1 2 3 
32.  Not being sure of what you want in life 0 1 2 3 
33.  Bad thoughts or feelings during sex 0 1 2 3 
 Never  Often 
34. Being easily annoyed by other people 0 1 2 3 
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35. Starting arguments or picking fights to get your anger out 0 1 2 3 
36. Having sex or being sexual to keep from feeling lonely or sad 0 1 2 3 
37. Getting angry when you didn’t want to 0 1 2 3 
38. Not being able to feel your emotions 0 1 2 3 
39. Confusion about your sexual feelings 0 1 2 3 
40. Using drugs other than Marijuana 0 1 2 3 
41. Feeling jumpy 0 1 2 3 
42. Absent-mindedness 0 1 2 3 
43. Feeling paralysed for minutes at a time 0 1 2 3 
44. Needing other people to tell you what to do 0 1 2 3 
45. Yelling or telling people off when you felt you shouldn’t have 0 1 2 3 
46. Flirting or “coming on” to someone to get attention 0 1 2 3 
47. Sexual thoughts or feelings when you thought you shouldn’t have 
had them 
0 1 2 3 
48. Intentionally hurting yourself (for example by scratching, cutting or 
burning) even though you weren’t trying to commit suicide 
0 1 2 3 
49. Aches and pains 0 1 2 3 
50. Sexual fantasies about being dominated or overpowered 0 1 2 3 
51. High anxiety 0 1 2 3 
52. Problems in your sexual relations with another person 0 1 2 3 
53. Wishing you had more money 0 1 2 3 
54. Nervousness 0 1 2 3 
55. Getting confused about what you thought or believed 0 1 2 3 
56. Feeling tired 0 1 2 3 
57. Feeling mad or angry inside 0 1 2 3 
58. Getting into trouble because of your drinking 0 1 2 3 
59. Staying away from certain people or places because they reminded 
you of something 
0 1 2 3 
60. One side of your body going numb 0 1 2 3 
61. Wishing you could stop thinking about sex 0 1 2 3 
62. Suddenly remembering something upsetting from your past 0 1 2 3 
63. Wanting to hit something or someone 0 1 2 3 
64. Feeling hopeless 0 1 2 3 
65. Hearing someone talk to you who wasn’t really there 0 1 2 3 
66. Suddenly being reminded of something bad 0 1 2 3 
67. Trying to block out certain memories 0 1 2 3 
68. Sexual problems 0 1 2 3 
69. Using sex to feel powerful or important 0 1 2 3 
70. Violent dreams 0 1 2 3 
71. Acting “sexy” even though you didn’t really want sex 0 1 2 3 
72. Just for a moment, seeing or hearing something upsetting that 
happened earlier in your life 
0 1 2 3 
73. Using sex to get love or attention 0 1 2 3 
74. Frightening or upsetting thoughts popping into your mind 0 1 2 3 
75. Getting your own feelings mixed up with someone else’s 0 1 2 3 
76. Wanting to have sex with someone who you knew was bad for you 0 1 2 3 
77. Feeling ashamed about your sexual feelings or behaviour 0 1 2 3 
78. Trying to keep from being alone 0 1 2 3 
79. Losing your sense of taste 0 1 2 3 
80. Your feelings or thought changing when you were with other 
people 
0 1 2 3 
81. Having sex that had to be kept secret from other people 0 1 2 3 
 Never  Often 
82. Worrying that someone is trying to steal your ideas 0 1 2 3 
154 
 
83. Not letting yourself feel bad about the past 0 1 2 3 
84. Feeling like things weren’t real 0 1 2 3 
85. Feeling like you were in a dream 0 1 2 3 
86. Not eating or sleeping for 2 or more days 0 1 2 3 
87. Trying not to have feelings about something that once hurt you 0 1 2 3 
88. Daydreaming 0 1 2 3 
89. Trying not to think or talk about things in your life that were painful 0 1 2 3 
90. Feeling like life wasn’t worth living 0 1 2 3 
91. Being startled or frightened by sudden noises 0 1 2 3 
92. Seeing people from the spirit world 0 1 2 3 
93. Trouble controlling your temper 0 1 2 3 
94. Being easily influenced by others 0 1 2 3 
95. Wishing you didn’t have any sexual feelings 0 1 2 3 
96. Wanting to set fire to a public building 0 1 2 3 
97. Feeling afraid that you might die or be injured 0 1 2 3 
98. Feeling so depressed that you avoided people 0 1 2 3 
99. Thinking that someone was reading your mind 0 1 2 3 
100. Feeling worthless 0 1 2 3 
 
     
     
     
              Thank you for completing these questionnaires.  We really appreciate your assistance. 
 
 
        Please remember to complete the attached form if you wish to be entered into the prize draw. 
    
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     













Regulation of Emotion Questionnaire 2 
 
We all experience lots of different feelings or emotions.  For example, different things in our lives make us feel 
happy, sad, angry and so on…  
 
The following questions ask you to think about how often you do certain things in response to your emotions. 
You do not have to think about specific emotions but just how often you generally do the things listed below. 
Please tick the box corresponding to the answer that fits best.  We all respond to our emotions in different 




Never Seldom Often Very Often Always 
1. I talk to someone about how I feel 
     
2. I take my feelings out on others verbally   
(e.g. shouting, arguing) 
     
3. I seek physical contact from friends or 
family  (e.g. a hug, hold hands) 
     
4. I review (rethink) my thoughts or beliefs 
     
5. I harm or punish myself in some way 
     
6. I do something energetic 
         (e.g. play sport, go for a walk) 
     
 
7. I dwell on my thoughts and feelings 
(e.g. It goes round and round in my head 
and I can’t stop it) 
 
     
8. I ask others for advice 
     






Never Seldom Often Very Often Always 




9. I review (rethink) my goals or plans 
     
10. I take my feelings out on others 
physically (e.g. fighting, lashing out) 
     
11. I put the situation into perspective 
     
12. I concentrate on a pleasant activity 
     
13. I try to make others feel bad  
(e.g. being rude, ignoring them) 
     
14. I think about people better off and make 
myself feel worse 
     
15. I keep the feeling locked up inside 
     
16. I plan what I could do better next time 
     
17. I bully other people  (e.g. saying nasty 
things to them,  hitting them) 
     
18. I take my feelings out on objects around 
me   (e.g. deliberately causing damage to    
  my house, school or outdoor things) 
     
19.  Things feel unreal   (e.g. I feel strange, 
things around   me feel strange, I 
daydream) 
     
20.  I telephone friends or family 
 
     
21.  I go out and do something nice (e.g. 
cinema, shopping, go for a meal, meet 
people) 
     






Demographics Survey  
 
Post-Traumatic Reactions to Flooding  
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research.   
 
You will now be asked to complete a number of questionnaires.  Each one gives its own instructions about how 
to complete it but please do ask for assistance if you are not sure what to do. 
 








1) Please give an indication of the severity of the flood impact within your property 
 
E.g.  Height of the water    
 .................................................................................... 
  
Indication of the extent of possessions lost 
 .................................................................................... 
  






2) Did you leave your home during the flood?  (please circle)    Yes / No 
  
E.g.  Evacuated during flood  
  Decided to leave your home during flood 
  Stayed at home throughout           (please delete as applicable) 
 






3) Did you leave your home after the flood (after water had receded)?  (please circle)  Yes / No 
  
E.g.  Lived away during reinstatement 
  Stayed at home during reinstatement work  (please delete as applicable) 
 
 






4) Have you had any difficulties with insurance companies, utilities agencies, contractors?   
          
(please circle)  Yes / No 
 












This study is interested in the impact of flood-related trauma but other traumatic events in your life may 
also affect your answers to the questionnaires.  It is therefore useful for us to know whether you have 
experienced other traumas as well as the flood.   
 
 
Have you experienced any trauma BEFORE the flood?   (please circle)  Yes / No 
 









Have you experienced any trauma SINCE the flood?    (please circle)  Yes / No 
 













Open plan for Qualitative Interviews 
 
 
Discuss consent and anonymity 
 
Might be distressing to talk about events and entitles to withdraw at any point they might wish 
 
 
Clarify any questions before starting 
 
Enquire about their specific flood experience 
 
 
Aspects of events that stood out as being particularly emotional 
 
What thoughts / images went through mind at these times? 
 
 
Significance / meaning of the event to the person at the time / meanings after 
event 







How did they feel at the time – physically and emotionally 




Disgust / Shame 
Permutations of all 
Others 
 
Had vivid thoughts / memories / images about aspects of the event 
 
 
Look of for intrusions 
 
How did they feel when this happened? 




Disgust / Shame 
Permutations of all 
Others 
 
What did these experiences make people want to do 










Kolmogorov-Smirnov analyses for Carlisle and Morpeth Flooded samples 
 
 Area CARLISLE MORPETH 
Flooded Flooded 






Anger1 31 0.601 0.863 26 0.595 0.871 
Sadness1 31 0.430 0.993 26 0.650 0.791 
Disgust1 31 1.181 0.123 26 1.143 0.2147 
Anxiety1 31 0.902 0.390 26 0.786 0.568 






Anger2 31 0.609 0.853 26 0.855 0.458 
Sadness2 31 0.615 0.844 26 0.991 0.279 
Disgust2 31 1.470 0.027 26 1.094 0.183 
Anxiety2 31 0.667 0.765 26 0.937 0.344 
Happiness2 31 0.649 0.793 26 0.542 0.930 
 
Impact of Events 
Scale – Revised 
(IES-R) 
Avoidance 31 1.050 0.220 26 0.654 0.785 
Intrusion 31 1.006 0.263 26 0.851 0.464 
Hyperarousal 31 1.255 0.086 26 1.077 0.197 









31 0.938 0.342 26 0.598 0.867 
Internal-
Functional 
31 0.724 0.671 26 0.881 0.419 
External-
Dysfunctional 
31 2.000 0.001* 26 1.112 0.169 
External-
Functional 
























31 0.727 0.665 26 0.610 0.851 
Depression 
D 












31 0.632 0.819 26 0.514 0.954 
Dissociation 
DIS 












31 0.869 0.436 26 1.365 0.048 






31 1.343 0.054 26 1.010 0.260 
Appendix 14 
Skewness / Kurtosis of Carlisle Sample 
 
























Scale – During 
Flood 
Anger1 4.06 1.732 -0.321 -0.237 - -1.040 -1.267 - 
Sadness1 4.02 1.722 -0.045 -0.107 - -0.716 -0.872 - 
Disgust1 1.68 0.889 1.020 2.422 <0.05 0.439 0.534 - 
Anxiety1 4.65 1.527 -0.677 -1.608 - -0.118 0.144 - 




Scale – After 
Flood 
Anger2 5.02 1.724 1.160 2.755 <0.01 3.703 4.510 <0.01 
Sadness2 3.81 1.621 0.107 0.254 - -0.302 -0.367 - 
Disgust2 1.55 0.710 1.236 2.935 <0.01 0.510 0.621 - 
Anxiety2 4.73 1.752 -0.505 1.199 - -0.546 0.665 - 




Avoidance 0.90 0.861 1.015 2.410 <0.05 0.539 0.656 - 
Intrusion 1.01 0.968 0.807 2.066 <0.05 -0.601 -0.732 - 
Hyperarousal 0.84 0.908 1.369 3.251 <0.01 1.295 1.577 - 





Internal-Dysfunctional 1.94 0.639 0.538 1.277 - -0.545 -0.663 - 
Internal-Functional 3.13 0.700 0.462 1.097 - -0.615 -0.749 - 
External-Dysfunctional 1.30 0.218 0.942 2.237 <0.05 0.051 0.621 - 







Atypical Responses 50.94 12.132 2.526 6.00 <0.001 6.398 7.792 - 
Response Level  46.52 9.726 2.931 6.961 <0.001 2.931 14.316 <0.001 
Inconsistent Response  53.26 9.187 0.768 1.824 - 0.768 1.137 - 
Anxious Arousal 52.29 11.391 1.129 2.681 <0.01 1.129 2.084 <0.05 
Depression 52.23 8.980 1.175 2.790 <0.01 1.175 1.644 - 
Anger / Irritability 49.16 8.087 0.817 1.940 - 0.817 0.054 - 
Intrusive Experiences  54.55 12.105 1.536 3.648 <0.001 2.704 3.293 <0.001 
Defensive Avoidance  52.58 9.639 0.684 1.624 - -0.302 -0.367 - 
Dissociation 57.03 14.197 1.068 2.536 <0.05 1.305 1.589 - 
Sexual Concerns 49.71 8.478 1.756 4.171 <0.001 3.554 4.328 <0.001 
Dysfunctional Sexual Behaviour  45.65 2.229 2.583 6.135 <0.001 7.543 9.187 <0.001 
Impaired Self Reference 54.06 12.220 1.891 4.491 <0.001 5.353 6.520 <0.001 















Skewness / Kurtosis of Morpeth Sample 
 
























Scale – During 
Flood 
Anger1 4.17 1.634 -0.487 -1.067 - -0.540 -0.608 - 
Sadness1 3.97 1.960 -0.078 -0.171 - -1.311 -1.478 - 
Disgust1 2.04 1.173 0.852 1.868 - -0.250 0.281 - 
Anxiety1 4.82 1.723 -0.674 -1.478 - -0.366 -0.412 - 




Scale – After 
Flood 
Anger2 4.94 1.287 -0.696 -1.526 - -0.004 -0.004 - 
Sadness2 4.14 1.831 -0.129 -0.282 - -1.475 -1.663 - 
Disgust2 2.21 1.473 1.067 2.339 <0.05 0.095 0.107 - 
Anxiety2 5.15 1.600 -0.806 -1.767 - -0.231 -0.260 - 




Avoidance 1.40 0.870 0.193 0.423 - -0.784 -0.985 - 
Intrusion 1.81 0.906 -0.499 -1.094 - -0.231 -0.260 - 
Hyperarousal 1.62 0.871 -0.375 -0.822 - -0.268 -0.302 - 





Internal-Dysfunctional 1.95 0.774 0.037 0.081 - -0.191 -0.215 - 
Internal-Functional 2.95 0.317 -0.179 -0.392 - 0.438 -0.493 - 
External-Dysfunctional 1.41 0.360 0.607 1.331 - -0.682 -0.768 - 







Atypical Responses 49.96 9.310 2.428 5.324 <0.001 6.645 7.491 <0.001 
Response Level  44.00 7.574 2.138 4.688 <0.001 4.190 4.723 <0.001 
Inconsistent Response  53.19 9.633 0.716 1.570 - 1.223 1.378 - 
Anxious Arousal 60.88 13.204 0.167 0.366 - -0.643 -0.724 - 
Depression 59.50 12.153 0.357 0.782 - -1.220 -1.375 - 
Anger / Irritability 57.69 10.620 0.401 0.879 - -0.723 -0.815 - 
Intrusive Experiences  56.77 10.328 0.471 1.032 - -0.595 -0.670 - 
Defensive Avoidance  54.92 9.325 0.468 1.026 - 0.085 0.095 - 
Dissociation 59.38 14.800 1.115 2.445 <0.05 0.525 0.591 - 
Sexual Concerns 50.46 9.017 1.465 3.192 <0.01 1.870 2.108 <0.01 
Dysfunctional Sexual Behaviour  47.23 4.893 2.050 4.495 <0.001 3.342 3.767 <0.001 
Impaired Self Reference 59.00 13.825 1.332 2.921 <0.01 1.550 1.747 - 
















Homogeneity of Variance for both samples 
 
Homogeneity of Variance Testing –  
Carlisle / Morpeth 
Levene Statistic  















Scale – During 
Flood 
Anger1 0.146 1,50 0.704 
Sadness1 1.789 1,50 0.187 
Disgust1 2.397 1,50 0.128 
Anxiety1 1.012 1,50 0.319 
Happiness1 0.719 1,50 0.400 
Basic 
Emotions 
Scale – After 
Flood 
Anger2 0.246 1,50 0.622 
Sadness2 3.402 1,50 0.071 
Disgust2 15.605 1,50 0.000* 
Anxiety2 0.082 1,50 0.776 




Avoidance 0.000 1,50 0.997 
Intrusion 0.000 1,50 0.993 
Hyperarousal 0.188 1,50 0.666 





Internal-Dysfunctional 0.263 1,50 0.610 
Internal-Functional 14.820 1,50 0.000* 
External-Dysfunctional 10.258 1,50 0.002 







Atypical Responses 0.863 1,50 0.357 
Response Level  0.197 1,50 0.659 
Inconsistent Response  0.140 1,50 0.709 
Anxious Arousal 0.478 1,50 0.492 
Depression 6.273 1,50 0.016 
Anger / Irritability 4.463 1,50 0.040 
Intrusive Experiences  0.297 1,50 0.588 
Defensive Avoidance  0.541 1,50 0.465 
Dissociation 0.068 1,50 0.497 
Sexual Concerns 1.382 1,50 0.245 
Dysfunctional Sexual 
Behaviour  
4.071 1,50 0.049 
Impaired Self Reference 0.874 1,50 0.354 
Tension Reduction 
Behaviour 








Hypothesis 2 a)  
 
Independent samples t-tests comparing emotions during flooding: Carlisle versus Morpeth  
 
 





































-0.761 93 0.449 
 






Hypothesis 2 b)  
Independent samples t -tests comparing emotions after flooding: Carlisle versus Morpeth  
 



































1.703 93 0.092 
 
* not significant for adjusted alpha level (0.05 / 5) = 0.01 ** significant for adjusted alpha level (0.05 / 4) = 0.01 
 
 
Paired samples t-tests comparing emotions before flooding with emotions after flooding: 
Carlisle and Morpeth  
 



































-0.684 94 0.000** 





Hypothesis 3a)  
Independent samples analysis of variance comparing flood -related measures  
 
i) Flooded 3 feet or less versus flooded 3 feet or more: Morpeth  
 
Measure Group Mean S.D. F df Signif 
Anger 1 < 3 feet 





2.227 1,21 0.151 
Sadness 1 < 3 feet 





0.077 1,21 0.784 
Disgust 1 < 3 feet 





0.102 1,21 0.752 
Anxiety 1 < 3 feet 





0.301 1,21 0.589 
Happiness 1 < 3 feet 





4.063 1,21 0.057 
Anger 2 < 3 feet 





1.234 1,21 0.279 
Sadness 2 < 3 feet 





0.674 1,21 0.421 
Disgust 2 < 3 feet 





2.443 1,21 0.133 
Anxiety 2 < 3 feet 





0.004 1,21 0.951 
Happiness 2 < 3 feet 





1.748 1,21 0.200 
Avoidance < 3 feet 





0.017 1,21 0.898 
Intrusion < 3 feet 





2.055 1,21 0.166 
Hyperarousal < 3 feet 





1.246 1,21 0.277 
TSI mean < 3 feet 

















Hypothesis 3a)  
Independent samples analysis of variance comparing flood -related measures  
 
ii)  Left home during flood versus stayed: Morpeth  
 
Measure Group Mean S.D. F df Signif 






0.390 1,21 0.539 






1.812 1,21 0.193 






0.262 1,21 0.614 






1.665 1,21 0.118 






0.003 1,21 0.959 






0.231 1,21 0.636 






0.458 1,21 0.506 






0.025 1,21 0.877 






0.070 1,21 0.791 



























0.037 1,21 0.849 
















Hypothesis 3a)  
Independent samples analysis of variance comparing flood -related measures  
 
iv)  Insurance difficulties versus no insurance difficulties: Morpeth  
 
Measure Group Mean S.D. F df Signif 






0.234 1,21 0.634 






0.195 1,21 0.663 






0.437 1,21 0.516 






0.372 1,21 0.548 






0.011 1,21 0.918 






1.793 1,21 0.195 






1.565 1,21 0.225 






0.453 1,21 0.508 






2.265 1,21 0.147 



























2.197 1,21 0.153 


















Hypothesis 3c)  
Independent samples analysis of variance comparing flood -related measures  
 
Change over time: Carlisle versus Morpeth  
 





















6.661 1,55 0.013* 






6.347 1,55 0.015* 
 
* significant at 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
